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I. INTRAGROUP GUARANTIES IN AN ECONOMIC WORLD OF
CORPORATE GROUPS
One of the major sources of the economic strength of the large
corporate group, particularly the multinational enterprise, is its abil-
ity to direct available group resources to the companies within the
group that can earn the highest return for comparable risks and
thereby maximize group profits. ' In brief, the parent corporation typ-
ically centralizes and exercises the financial decisionmaking power of
the group,2 acting as an internal capital market by channelling avail-
able group resources to the most advantageous investment opportuni-
ties available within the group. Such intragroup financing necessarily
involves intercompany loans and guaranties.
When lending to enterprises of smaller dimensions, lenders will
commonly insist upon guaranties by group affiliates, controlled corpo-
rations, or controlling shareholders before they will lend to any cor-
I See Landers, Another Word on Parents, Subsidiaries and Affiliates in Bankruptcy, 43 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 527, 532 (1976); Landers, A Unified Approach to Parent, Subsidiary and Affiliate
Questions in Bankruptcy, 42 U. Chi. L. Rev. 589, 591-92 (1975); Littman, Multiple Intent,
Veil-Piercing, and Burdens and Benefits: Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Multiparty Trans-
actions, 39 U. Miami L. Rev. 307, 315 (1985). But see Posner, The Rights of Creditors of
Affiliated Corporations, 43 U. Chi. L. Rev. 499, 521-24 (1976).
2 See A. Rugman, Inside the Multinationals 75-88 (1981).
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ponent of the group. This requirement strengthens the borrower's
credit and avoids possible intragroup manipulation of its affairs to the
lender's detriment. In some cases, such strengthening of the bor-
rower's credit position may also serve the borrower's interests by con-
tributing to the negotiation of a somewhat lower interest rate. In
other cases, such guaranties may be required to make the borrowing
possible at all.
Intragroup financing also plays an important role in leveraged
buyout acquisitions where the assets or credit of the corporation being
acquired are utilized for the payment to, or to secure the payment of,
the selling shareholders.3 Although commentators have criticized the
application of the fraudulent transfer laws to leveraged buyouts,4 nu-
merous cases under the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act
("UFCA") and the bankruptcy laws have avoided such transfers
when these statutes were otherwise applicable.5
3 See generally Ash, The Lender, in Leveraged Buyouts 195, 223-34 (P.L.I. Corp. L. & P.
No. 393, 1982) (noting that the net effect of leveraged buyouts is benefit to the target's share-
holders before the creditor financing the leveraged buyout is benefitted); Coquillette, Guaranty
of and Security for the Debt of a Parent Corporation by a Subsidiary Corporation, 30 Case W.
Res. 433, 436, 442 (1980) (subsidiary may have difficulty showing required benefit for guaranty
of loan to its parent); Douglas-Hamilton, Creditor Liabilities Resulting from Improper Inter-
ference with the Management of a Financially Troubled Debtor, 31 Bus. Law. 343, 348-52
(1975) (discussing the problems and liabilities of creditors who participate in the business af-
fairs of their debtors); Normandin, Intercorporate Guaranties and Fraudulent Conveyances, in
Personal Property Security Interests under the Revised UCC 361, 386-93 (P.L.I. Comm. L. &
P. No. 175, 1977) (bootstrap acquisitions and similar problems); Rosenberg, Fraudulent Con-
veyance and Preference Implications of Leveraged Acquisitions, in Leveraged Business Acqui-
sitions 147-204 (P.L.I. Corp. L. & P. No. 305, 1979) (general discussion of subject matter).
4 See Baird & Jackson, Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Its Proper Domain, 38 Vand. L.
Rev. 829, 850-54 (1985). But see Carlson, Leveraged Buyouts in Bankruptcy, 20 Ga. L. Rev.
73, 76, 120 (1985) (suggesting the relaxation of fraudulent transfer rules to exclude liability if
the lender reasonably believed that the company, although insolvent, had a fair chance to
survive).
5 See, e.g., Branch v. Steph, 389 F.2d 233 (10th Cir. 1968); Credit Managers Ass'n v.
Federal Co., 629 F. Supp. 175, 183-88 (C.D. Cal. 1985); Palmer v. Stokely, 255 F. Supp. 674
(Wv.D. Okla. 1966); In re Process-Manz Press, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 333 (N.D. I11. 1964), rev'd on
other grounds, 369 F.2d 513 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 957 (1967); Anderson
Indus., Inc. v. Anderson (In re Anderson Indus., Inc.), 55 Bankr. 922 (Bankr. W.D. Mich.
1985); Rodino v. Barondess (In re Good Time Charley's, Inc.), 54 Bankr. 157 (Bankr. D.N.J.
1984); Consove v. Cohen (In re Roco Corp.), 15 Bankr. 813 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1981), aff'd in
part, vacated in part, 21 Bankr. 429 (Bankr. 1st Cir. 1982), aft'd, 701 F.2d 978 (1st Cir. 1983).
See Roxbury State Bank v. The Clarendon, 123 N.J. Super. 400, 303 A.2d 340 (1973), modi-
fied, 129 N.J. Super. 358, 373-76, 324 A.2d 24, 32-34 (1974) (construing New Jersey enactment
of the UFCA), cert. denied, 66 N.J. 316, 331 A.2d 16 (1974); cf. Ohio Corrugating Co. v.
Security Pac. Business Credit, Inc. (In re Ohio Corrugating Co.), 70 Bankr. 920, 926 (Bankr.
N.D. Ohio 1987) (in denying motion for summary judgment because record was incomplete as
to whether debtor received reasonably equivalent value in exchange for transfer at issue, the
court held that "as a matter of law [the UFCA] may be applied to leveraged buyouts"); Gough
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Intragroup guaranties 6 -downstream,7 upstream,8  and cross-
stream 9-play an important role in the financing of corporate groups.
An increasing part of the world economy is being conducted by mul-
tinational enterprises in the form of groups of companies with struc-
tures of "incredible complexity" operating in dozens of countries,
through scores, if not hundreds, of subsidiaries.' 0 Therefore, the is-
sues of whether such guaranties are valid and enforceable under cor-
poration law, and whether such guaranties or payments honoring
them constitute fraudulent transfers under the Uniform Fraudulent
Transfer Act ("UFTA"), the UFCA" and the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978 ("Code")' 2 loom large in the commercial world.
Whether such guaranties or payments constitute voidable preferences
or are subject to equitable subordination under the Code presents ad-
v. Titus (In re Christian & Porter Aluminum Co.), 584 F.2d 326, 335-37 (9th Cir. 1978)
(avoiding a transfer of assets and security interest in favor of debtor's purchaser).
6 See P. Blumberg, The Law of Corporate Groups: Problems in the Bankruptcy or Reor-
ganization of Parent and Subsidiary Corporations, Including the Law of Corporate Guaranties
246-83 (1985) [hereinafter Blumberg, Corporate Groups: Bankruptcy].
7 A downstream guaranty is a guaranty by a controlling shareholder of the obligation of a
controlled corporation. Within a corporate group, it is the guaranty of the higher-tier com-
pany of the obligations of a lower-tier company. In other words, it is the guaranty by the
corporate parent of the obligations of a first-tier or lower-tier subsidiary or by a first-tier sub-
sidiary of the obligations of a second-tier or lower-tier subsidiary. It is irrelevant whether the
guarantor itself holds the shares of the lower-tier subsidiary or whether a subsidiary does so.
8 An upstream guaranty is a guaranty by a controlled corporation of the obligation of its
controlling shareholder, i.e., within the corporate group, the lower-tier subsidiary guarantees
the obligations of the parent or of a higher-tier subsidiary.
9 A cross-stream guaranty is a guaranty by one affiliated corporation of another affiliated
corporation, i.e., another corporation controlled directly or indirectly by the same controlling
shareholder. .
1o For tax, accounting, political, or administrative convenience, or to avoid qualification
under foreign corporation statutes, the large enterprise today almost universally conducts its
business through many subsidiary corporations. The parent and the subsidiaries constitute a
corporate group which collectively conducts the business of the enterprise throughout the
country and the world. In 1982, the 1,000 largest American industrial corporations had an
average of about 50 subsidiaries each. See P. Blumberg, The Law of Corporate Groups: Pro-
cedural Problems in the Law of Parent and Subsidiary Corporations § 2.02.1, at 28-29, Tables
5, 6, 7, at 465-70 (1983). Mobil Corporation, an extreme example, has operated in 62 different
countries through as many as 525 subsidiaries. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes,
445 U.S. 425, 440-41 (1980). In England, British Petroleum operates through more than 1,000
subsidiaries, and Unilever has more than 800. See Hadden, Inside Corporate Groups, 12 Int'l
J. Soc. L. 271, 274 (1984). The Swiss multinational, Nestle, S.A., operates in more than 60
countries with 600 subsidiaries. See Impressions 10 (Stouffer Hotel Co., Winter 1985). In
some cases, the subsidiaries conduct truly separate businesses, but most often the subsidiary is
only a part or a fragment of the larger business of its parent, which is collectively conducted by
the various affiliates under common general direction.
I I The UFTA and UFCA will sometimes be collectively referred to as the "Uniform
Acts."
12 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151326 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
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ditional issues. This Article explores the UFTA's impact on intra-
group guaranties.
II. ENFORCEABILITY OF UPSTREAM AND CROSS-STREAM
GUARANTIES UNDER CORPORATE LAW
Before one reaches the question of whether a guaranty otherwise
valid may still be avoided as a fraudulent transfer or a voidable prefer-
ence, one must address the threshold issue of the enforceability of in-
tragroup guaranties, particularly upstream and cross-stream
guaranties, 3 under corporation law. 4 Although it would appear that
13 The source of the difficulty is that in the upstream or cross-stream transaction, the guar-
antor company has no proprietary interest in the affiliate whose obligation is being guaranteed.
In the case of the downstream guaranty, the parent corporation (or other upper-tier company)
directly or indirectly owns all or a controlling block of the shares of the lower-tier subsidiary
whose obligation it is guaranteeing. By reason of such proprietary interest, the economic bene-
fit to the parent-guarantor is evident. In addition, in the case of economically integrated cor-
porate groups, the guarantor's interests are furthered by assistance to its affiliated customer or
supplier. E.g., General Inv. Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 248 F. 303 (D.N.J. 1918); In re
New York Car Wheel Works, 141 F. 430 (W.D.N.Y. 1905); Alliegro v. Pan Am. Bank, 136
So. 2d 656 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962), cert. denied, 149 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 1963); American Sur.
Co. v. 14 Canal St., Inc., 276 Mass. 119, 125-26, 176 N.E. 785, 788 (1931); State Bank v.
Pacific Elevator Co., 159 Minn. 94, 198 N.W. 304 (1924); Jesselsohn v. Boorstein, 111 N.J. Eq.
310, 162 A. 254 (1932); Baker v. Edson Hotel Operating Co., 99 S.W.2d 998 (Tex. Civ. App.
1936); cf. Commercial State Say. Bank v. Bird, 254 Mich. 418, 237 N.W. 57 (1931) (control-
ling shareholder).
14 See generally Alces, The Efficacy of Guaranty Contracts in Sophisticated Commercial
Transactions, 61 N.C.L. Rev. 655, 676-83 (1983) (where statutes and case law tend to favor
guarantors, the author suggests that creditors' counsel can, through careful drafting, do much
to assure the validity of the guaranty contract); Cherin, Ash, & Burlingame, Enforceability of
Guarantees and Other Credit Support Provided Among Members of a Corporate Group: A
Bibliography, 34 Bus. Law. 2029 (1979) (bibliography of sources discussing fraudulent convey-
ance law, equitable subordination and "piercing the corporate veil"); Coquillette, supra note 3
(suggesting precautions which can be taken so that upstream guaranties will be valid, binding
and enforceable); Dwyer, A Legal and Business Examination of the Contractually Supported
Investment in Relation to the Corporate Guaranty, 23 Syracuse L. Rev. 33 (1972) (in today's
complex business world, a contractually supported investment may be more attractive than a
corporate guaranty); Everdell & Longstreth, Some Special Problems Raised by Debt Financing
of Corporations under Common Control, 17 Bus. Law. 500, 501 (1962) ("there are likely to be
few legal roadblocks in the way of sister corporation financing that a little imagination and
ingenuity in the construction of the terms of the transaction and preparation of the instru-
ments cannot effectively avoid"); Kreidmann, The Corporate Guaranty, 13 Vand. L. Rev. 229
(1959) (study of the effects of recent legislation regarding corporate guaranties); Ragusin,
Brother-Sister Corporate Guaranties: Increased Legal Acknowledgement of Business World
Realities, 11 J. Corp. L. 391 (1986) (review and update of the issues underlying enforceability
of cross-stream guaranties); Rosenberg, Intercorporate Guaranties and the Law of Fraudulent
Conveyances: Lender Beware, 125 U. Pa. L. Rev. 235 (1976) (analysis of the application of
fraudulent conveyance law to intracorporate guaranty agreements); Note, Upstream Financing
and Use of the Corporate Guaranty, 53 Notre Dame L. Rev. 840 (1978) (hereinafter Note,
Upstream Financing] (although there has been liberalization in the courts' interpretation of
corporate powers and their enforcement of guaranties in general, upstream guaranties have
received little judicial attention); Note, The Corporate Guaranty Revisited: Upstream, Down-
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this question has, for the most part, been long since resolved, some
corporate counselors are still concerned that the enforceability of such
guaranties under corporation law is not completely clear, at least for
purposes of issuing opinion letters. 5
As in so many other areas in the law of corporate groups, the
problem of intragroup guaranties arises primarily from the conflict
between managerial direction of the group in the interest of the enter-
prise as a whole and legal doctrines that have traditionally insisted on
the recognition of each corporate component of the enterprise as a
separate legal entity.' 6 Thus, in order to achieve profit maximization
for the enterprise as a whole, the parent's managers will typically wish
to structure the group's credit transactions in a way that will opti-
mally exploit the credit-worthiness of its stronger components. In ad-
dition, management should attempt to allocate the resources obtained
to the most promising investment opportunities within the group. As
a result, the subsidiary that is the guarantor or borrower in a financ-
ing is often pledging its credit to raise funds for the use of an affiliate
rather than for its own use. This situation gives rise to the concern
under the corporate law.
The corporate law problem traditionally involves two issues: cor-
porate power and corporate object. The initial question is whether
the corporation has the power to issue a guaranty under any circum-
stances. After the question of corporate power has been resolved, a
further question arises: Whether the issuance of a guaranty in the par-
ticular case furthers the guaranteeing corporation's objectives and
interests.
stream, and Beyond-A Statutory Approach, 32 Rutgers L. Rev. 312 (1979) [hereinafter Note,
Guaranty Revisited] (suggesting a statutory approach to the enforceability of corporate guar-
anties, especially where a corporation guarantees the obligations of another corporation);
Note, Guarantees and Section 548(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 194, 194-
95 (1985) [hereinafter Note, Section 548(a)(2)] (discussing "circumstances in which a guaran-
tee given by a guarantor who has become a debtor in bankruptcy can be set aside as a fraudu-
lent conveyance under section 548(a)(2) of the ... Code"); Note, "Ultra Vires" Corporate
Credit Transactions, 83 U. Pa. L. Rev. 479, 480-92 (1935) (discussing extension of a corpora-
tion's credit for benefit of some third person).
15 See Note, Guaranty Revisited, supra note 14, at 312-23; cef. Witt, Corporate Guaranties,
The Quest for Legislative Clarification, 36 Tex. B.J. 907, 912-14 (1973) (discussing amendment
of Texas' corporation law with regard to guaranties).
16 This fundamental dilemma frames the legal questions throughout the entire spectrum of
the law of corporate groups. See P. Blumberg, The Law of Corporate Groups: Procedural
Problems in the Law of Parent and Subsidiary Corporations (1983); P. Blumberg, Corporate
Groups: Bankruptcy, supra note 6; P. Blumberg, The Law of Corporate Groups: Tort, Con-
tract, and Other Common Law Problems in the Substantive Law of Parent and Subsidiary
Corporations (1987).
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A. Corporate Power
The question of corporate power is a problem of yesteryear. The
statutes of almost all states have long since resolved this issue by ex-
press grants of the power to guarantee. 7 In addition, the Model Busi-
ness Corporation Act includes a like provision."8 In the few
jurisdictions without such statutes,1 9 the inclusion of a power to guar-
antee in the certificate of incorporation, or even the implication of
such a power from more general powers in the certificate, should end
the inquiry.2 ° Finally, in isolated cases, even if a question still re-
mains, the statutes and judicial doctrines that restrict the assertion of
ultra vires to a narrowly circumscribed class of cases21 should, in most
cases, foreclose the matter.
B. Corporate Objects
Corporate common law generally assumes that corporate pow-
ers, however indisputable, may only be invoked in furtherance of cor-
porate objectives.22  Further, in the case of an accommodation
guaranty, the gratuitous nature of the undertaking presents a possible
violation of the related rule that a corporation may not give away any
portion of its assets without unanimous consent.23 Therefore, to sat-
isfy the corporate common law, it is necessary only that the guaranty
further the corporate interests of the guarantor corporation, whereas
formerly, a showing that the guarantor was directly benefitted by the
guaranty was required.24
17 Alabama, Alaska, North Dakota, South Dakota, and the District of Columbia are the
only jurisdictions without such statutes. See P. Blumberg, Corporate Groups: Bankruptcy,
supra note 6, § 6.02, at 249 n.3.
18 Model Business Corp. Act. Ann. § 3.02(7) (1984 & Supp. 1986) ("Unless its articles of
incorporation provide otherwise, every corporation... has the same powers as an individual to
do all things necessary to carry out its business and affairs, including without limitation power:
... (7) to make... guarantees."). Section 4(h) of the earlier Model Act provided that "[e]ach
corporation shall have power.., to make ... guarantees." Id. § 4(h) (1971).
19 See supra note 17.
20 See N. Lattin, The Law of Corporations 206 (2d ed. 1971).
21 See 7A W. Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations §§ 3495-3497, 3527-
3528, 3555-3562, at 119-24, 151-53, 168-76 (rev. perm. ed. 1978); H. Henn & J. Alexander,
Laws of Corporations and Other Business Enterprises § 184, at 477-84 (3d ed. 1983); see also
Model Business Corp. Act. § 3.04, at 226-37 (Supp. 1987) (ultra vires provision, official com-
ment and annotation, including historical background of ultra vires). All states have enacted
such statutes. Hawaii, for many years the only holdout, has at last done so. Haw. Rev. Stat.
§ 415-7 (1985).
22 See Real Estate-Land Title & Trust Co. v. Commonwealth Bond Corp., 63 F.2d 237,
238-39 (2d Cir. 1933).
23 See 6 W. Fletcher, supra note 21, § 2589, at 670-72 (rev. perm. ed. 1979).
24 See Kreidmann, supra note 14, at 232-34; Note, Upstream Financing, supra note 14, at
842-44.
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Over the years, however, the standard has expanded from the
restricted direct-benefit test to a much more liberal test resting on rea-
sonable business judgment.25 The commentary to the 1971 draft of
the Model Business Corporation Act concluded: "Guaranties should
be upheld if it is shown that the board of directors of the guarantor
had in good faith, and in the exercise of reasonable business judgment,
decided that the benefits derived from the guaranties were sufficient to
justify the liability incurred. ' ' 26 Further, where there was unanimous
shareholder consent, judicial decisions have upheld the enforceability
of intergroup guaranties, notwithstanding contentions that the guar-
anties were not in pursuance of the guaranteeing corporation's corpo-
rate purposes.27 Accordingly, in the case of wholly owned
subsidiaries, the parent's readily available consent would remove any
question of the validity of an upstream or cross-stream guaranty.28
The courts have overwhelmingly upheld the validity under cor-
poration law of upstream, 29 and cross-stream, 30 as well as down-
stream guaranties. 31  Numerous jurisdictions have also adopted
25 See Real Estate-Land Title & Trust Co., 63 F.2d at 238-39.
26 1 Model Business Corp. Act Ann. § 4(h) (2d ed. 1971).
27 E.g., Libco Corp. v. Leigh (In re Reliable Mfg. Corp.), 703 F.2d 996, 1003 (7th Cir.
1983); New England Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Lost Valley Corp., 119 N.H. 254, 400 A.2d
1178 (1979).
28 The corporation owes no duty to creditors where it is not insolvent or imminently facing
insolvency. See Blumberg, Corporate Groups: Bankruptcy, supra note 6, § 6.13, at 280-82
(1985); Baxt, Companies-Extent of Duty Owed by Directors of a Company to Its Creditors
and Others, 60 Austl. L.J. 102 (1986).
29 E.g., Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co. v. Goldman (In re Ollag Constr. Equip.
Corp.), 578 F.2d 904, 906-07 (2d Cir. 1978); Cate v. Nicely (In re Knox Kreations, Inc.), 474
F. Supp. 567 (E.D. Tenn. 1979), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 656 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1981); New
England Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Lost Valley Corp., 119 N.H. 254, 400 A.2d 1178 (1979);
Lochsley Hall Inc. v. Filmvideo Releasing Corp., 36 A.D.2d 694, 318 N.Y.S.2d 864 (1971)
(per curiam); Hayman v. Morris, 46 N.Y.S.2d 482 (Sup. Ct. 1943). But cf. Jackson v. M.H.
Thomas Inv. Co., 46 F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 1931) (guaranty by a corporation of its controlling
shareholder's personal obligation would have been enforced but for the existence of creditors
of the corporation; the court held that claim of shareholder's creditor in whose favor the cor-
porate guaranty was made was subordinate to those of corporation's primary creditors).
30 Gotshal v. Mill Factors Corp. (In re Gartner Importing Corp.), 289 F. 1005 (2d Cir.
1923); In re Duncan & Goodell Co., 15 F. Supp. 550 (D. Mass. 1936); Power County v. Evans
Bros. Land & Live Stock Co., 43 Idaho 158, 252 P. 182 (1926); American Union Fin. Corp. v.
University Nat'l Bank, 44 Ill. App. 3d 566, 358 N.E.2d 646 (1976); Stromberg-Carlson Tel.
Mfg. Co. v. George C. Beckwith Co., 193 Minn. 255, 258 N.W. 314 (1935); McCarty v. Nos-
trand Lumber Co., 232 A.D. 63, 248 N.Y.S. 606 (1931); Empire Steel Corp. v. Omni Steel
Corp., 378 S.W.2d 905 (Tex. Ct. App. 1964). Cf. In re First Nat'l Bank v. Retirement
Ranches, Inc., 90 N.M. 546, 566 P.2d 95 (1977) (apparent cross-stream guaranty upheld as
valid; the court characterized debtor corporation as a "related corporation;" therefore, unclear
whether guaranty was, in actuality, cross-stream).
31 Central R.R. & Banking Co. v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 114 F. 263 (C.C.A.N.Y.),
cert. denied, 186 U.S. 482 (1902); Eckhout v. Guardian Nat'l Bank (In re Battani), 6 F. Supp.
376 (E.D. Mich. 1934); Henderson Tire & Rubber Co. v. Gregory, 16 F.2d 589 (8th Cir. 1926);
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statutes dealing with the validity of such guaranties. For example,
North Carolina prohibits upstream guaranties of any majority share-
holder's obligations.32 California authorizes a corporate guaranty of
the obligations of any shareholder upon approval by a majority of the
shareholders, with the interested shareholder barred from voting.3"
Such restrictive statutes, however, are the exception.
Most statutes confirm, or prescribe the procedure for confirming,
the validity of intragroup guaranties. New York,34 New Jersey,3" and
Rhode Island36 have enacted statutes confirming the validity of intra-
group guaranties, even though not issued in furtherance of corporate
purposes, if the guaranty has been approved by a majority or two-
thirds of the shareholders.
Minnesota authorizes corporations to issue guaranties for the
benefit of majority-owned related corporations. 37 Its statute contains
no references regarding benefit to the guarantor. However, the re-
porter's note clearly indicates that transfers of funds within the corpo-
rate group are regarded as being in the interests of each affiliate of the
group. "The ability to bolster the finances of a related corporation...
is important because these related corporations are often part of one
economic unit within which artificial distinctions should not prevent
internal transfers of funds. '38  Washington has authorized the issu-
ance of upstream and cross-stream guaranties "if such guarantee may
reasonably be expected to benefit, directly or indirectly, the guarantor
Federal Reserve Bank v. Pacific Grain Co., 2 F.2d 270 (D. Or. 1924); General Inv. Co. v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 248 F. 303 (D.N.J. 1918); In re New York Car Wheel Works, 141 F.
430 (W.D.N.Y. 1905); Alliegro v. Pan Am. Bank, 136 So. 2d 656 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 149 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 1962); Kelley, Glover & Vale, Inc. v. Heitman, 220 Ind. 625, 44
N.E.2d 981 (1942), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 762 (1943); American Sur. Co. v. 14 Canal St., Inc.,
276 Mass. 119, 176 N.E. 785 (1931); State Bank v. Pacific Elevator Co., 159 Minn. 94, 198
N.W. 304 (1924); Jesselsohn v. Boorstein, 111 N.J. Eq. 310, 162 A. 254 (1932); Ellerman v.
Chicago Junction Rys. & Union Stock-Yards, 49 N.J. Eq. 217, 23 A. 287 (1891); Chester
Airport, Inc. v. Aeroflex Corp., 37 Misc. 2d 145, 237 N.Y.S.2d 752 (1962), modified and aff'd
per curiam, 18 A.D.2d 998, 238 N.Y.S.2d 715 (1963); Nurick v. Baker, 14 N.Y.S.2d 503 (Sup.
Ct. 1939); Baker v. Edson Hotel Operating Co., 99 S.W.2d 998 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936); Ingram
v. Texas Christian Univ., 196 S.W. 608 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917).
32 N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-22(a)(3) (1982).
33 Cal. Corp. Code § 315 (Vest 1977 & Supp. 1987). However, courts have construed the
California statute to permit upstream guaranties only with the approval of 100% of the share-
holders. See I H. Marsh, Jr., California Corporation Law § 10.15, at 614-17 (2d ed. 1984); see,
e.g., Cechettini v. Consumer Assocs., 260 Cal. App. 2d 295, 67 Cal. Rptr. 15 (1968) (constru-
ing prior law).
34 N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 908 (McKinney 1986) (two-thirds).
35 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 14A:3-3 (West Supp. 1987) (two-thirds).
36 R.I. Gen. Laws § 7-1.1 to 4.2 (1985) (majority).
37 Minn. Stat. Ann. § 302A.501(1)(b) (West 1985). See also id. § 302A.011 (21), (25), (31)
(definitions).
38 Id. § 302A.501.
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corporation." 9 Since the statute goes on to make the decision of the
board of directors as to such benefit binding, it has effectively elimi-
nated any question as to validity.
Texas has approved the issuance of downstream, upstream and
cross-stream guaranties without regard to direct or indirect benefit to
the guaranteeing affiliate where the companies are wholly owned.40
In 1983 and 1985, Delaware enacted statutes confirming the validity
of upstream and cross-stream guaranties by wholly owned subsidiar-
ies, while keeping open for common law decision the circumstances
under which such guaranties by partly owned subsidiaries were
valid.4
These statutes represent a collective judgment as to the commer-
cial usefulness of intragroup guaranties and the desirability of the
elimination of any remaining uncertainty as to their enforceability as
a matter of corporation law. Further, such an expression of public
policy is bound to influence the decisions of courts facing the question
as a common-law matter.4"
Other common-law jurisdictions have moved in the same direc-
tion. In the United Kingdom, for example, The Companies Act ex-
pressly authorizes corporate upstream and downstream guaranties.43
Where the power to guarantee has been expressly provided, the Eng-
lish courts appear to have moved beyond the distinction between
power and object to uphold intergroup guaranties. 44  Thus, the
Charterbridge Corp. v. Lloyd's Bank, Ltd.45 case held that so long as a
cross-stream guaranty furthered the "interests of the individual [guar-
anteeing] company in relation to the group as a whole," it was not
ultra vires, irrespective of the subjective intentions of the controlling
39 1984 Wash. Laws, ch. 75, § 2(9).
40 Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 1302-2.06(A)-(C) (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 1987).
41 Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 122(13) (Supp. 1986).
42 Cf. Conference Center Ltd. v. TRC-The Research Corp., 189 Conn. 212, 224-25, 455
A.2d 857, 863 (1983) (using UCC provisions regarding unconscionable terms in contracts for
sale of goods to support decision with regard to foreclosure proceeding on a mortgage note);
Hamm v. Taylor, 180 Conn. 491, 494-95, 429 A.2d 946, 948 (1980) (same).
43 The Companies Act, 1980, ch. 22, § 50(1), (4), superseded by The Companies Act, 1985,
ch. 6, § 333.
44 See Rolled Steel Prods. (Holdings) Ltd. v. British Steel Corp., [1982] 3 All E.R. 1057
(Ch. 1981), rev'd in part C.A., [1985] 3 All E.R. 52; Re Horsly & Weight Ltd., [1982] 3 All
E.R. 1045 (C.A. 1980); Re Halt Garage (1964) Ltd., [1982] 3 All E.R. 1016 (Ch. 1978);
Charterbridge Corp. v. Lloyd's Bank Ltd., [1969] 2 All E.R. 1185 (Ch. 1968); Aldwinckle,
Corporate Law-New Developments-United Kingdom, I I Int'l Bus. Law. 46 (Dec. 1983);
Clark, Ultra Vires after Rolled Steel Products, 6 Co. Law. 155 (1985); Editorial, Acts Ultra
Vires the Company and Acts Ultra Vires the Directors, 1984 J. Bus. L. 296; Comment, Objects
and Powers in Company Law, 10 Sydney L. Rev. 405 (1984).




The Canadian Business Corporations Act47 and related Canadian
provincial statutes also expressly authorize upstream and cross-
stream guaranties by wholly owned subsidiaries. These statutes au-
thorize such guaranties by a wholly owned subsidiary even in cases
where the guaranteeing affiliate is insolvent.48
In summary, despite the lingering concern of some commenta-
tors,49 the validity and enforceability of cross-stream and upstream
guaranties under corporation law no longer presents important ques-
tions within the corporate group. In light of the economic interdepen-
dence of the group's component companies and the interest of each
component in strengthening the overall economic condition of the
group of which it is an integral part, the utilization of group financing
involving intercompany guaranties should be recognized as the very
sort of decision that should be left to the business judgment of the
corporate decisionmakers. Creditors have the protection of the provi-
sions of the Uniform Acts under state law and the Code in the event
of bankruptcy. With this preface on corporation law, this Article
considers the status of upstream and cross-stream guaranties under
the UFTA and, in particular, under those provisions that depart from
the provisions of the UFCA or the Code.5"
III. THE INTERRELATIONSHIP OF THE UNIFORM FRAUDULENT
TRANSFER ACT AND THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
The draftsmen of the UFCA generally followed the National
Bankruptcy Act ("Bankruptcy Act"), as amended.51 In the area of
fraudulent transfers, the provisions of the two statutes were generally
46 See Parkinson, Non-Commercial Transactions and the Interests of Creditors, 5 Co.
Law. 55, 56-59 (1984).
47 Can. Bus. Corp. Act, Can. Stat. ch. 33 (1974-75-76).
48 Id. § 42(2)(c). See Alberta Bus. Corp. Act, Alta. Stat. ch. B-15, § 42 (1981); Ontario
Bus. Corp. Act., Ont. Stat. ch. 4, § 20 (1982). See also Karvellas & Daniel, Limitations on the
Power of an Alberta Corporation to Provide Guaranties and Other Financial Assistance: Sec-
tion 42 of the (Alberta) Business Corporations Act, 23 Alta. L. Rev. 479 (1985).
49 See Alces, supra note 14, at 655, 676-83; Ash, The Lender, in Leveraged Acquisitions-
Public and Private 85, 94 (P.L.I. Corp. L. & P. No. 436, 1984) (should be avoided); Rosenberg,
supra note 14, at 257 (lender "should not rely upon the enforceability of such" guaranties);
Note, Upstream Financing, supra note 14, at 847, 860 (much more feasible but the law is far
from predictable); Note, Guaranty Revisited, supra note 14, at 321-27 (predictability tenuous).
Not all commentators are so cautious. See, e.g., Coquillette, supra note 3, at 445 ("[i]f due
precautions are taken, corporate authority should exist" (footnote omitted)).
50 Other than in the context of upstream and cross-stream guaranties, the provisions of the
Code are beyond the scope of this Article.
51 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1255 (1976) (repealed 1978).
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in harmony, even utilizing the same terms of art.52 When Congress
completed its review of the bankruptcy laws and enacted the Code,53
the provisions of the Code that departed from those of the Bank-
ruptcy Act inevitably conflicted with those of the UFCA that had
been modeled after the Act. As a result, there were a number of im-
portant areas in which the provisions of the two, including those pro-
visions pertaining to fraudulent transfers, were no longer in
agreement.
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws moved promptly to deal with this lack of consistency by
promulgating the UFTA. Most, although not all, of the UFTA's
more important innovations (that is, departures from the UFCA) are
derived from the Code, and the UFTA should be viewed as an effort
generally, but not universally, to harmonize the state statutes with the
Code.54 Only in isolated cases does the UFTA materially differ from
the Code. The following sections discuss these material differences
and the significant departures from the UFCA that the UFTA in-
troduces with respect to the treatment of upstream and cross-stream
guaranties.
IV. THE UNIFORM FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT AND
INTRAGROUP GUARANTIES
Four UFTA provisions represent significant departures from the
UFCA with respect to the treatment of guaranties, particularly up-
52 For example, compare 11 U.S.C. § 107d(3) (1976) (repealed 1978) which provided that
"[elvery transfer made and every obligation incurred by a debtor who is or will thereby be
rendered insolvent ... is fraudulent, as to then existing and future creditors" with U.F.C.A.
§ 4, 7A U.L.A. 474 (1985), which provides that "[e]very conveyance made and every obliga-
tion incurred by a person who is or will be thereby rendered insolvent is fraudulent as to
creditors".
53 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151326 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). See generally P. Blumberg, Corpo-
rate Groups: Bankruptcy, supra note 6, at 285-362 (review of statutory framework underlying
fraudulent transfer provisions contained in the Code and the UFCA); Carl, Fraudulent Trans-
fer Attacks on Guaranties in Bankruptcy, 60 Am. Bankr. L.J. 109 (1986) (applicability of
fraudulent transfer law to guaranties and grants of security interests made by affiliated corpo-
rations); Coquillette, supra note 3 (whether guaranties and security interests can be valid, bind-
ing and enforceable against a subsidiary); Littman, supra note 1 (uncertainty of enforcement of
intercorporate guaranties and of security interests in multiparty transactions); Ragusin, supra
note 14 (cross-stream guaranties and the Code); Rosenberg, supra note 14 (effect of fraudulent
conveyance provisions in both the UFCA and the Bankruptcy Act on intracorporate
guaranties).
54 See generally Alces & Dorr, A Critical Analysis of the New Uniform Fraudulent Trans-
fer Act, 1985 U. Ill. L. Rev. 527 (how the Code and UFTA adjust rights of parties affected by
certain fraudulent transactions); Kennedy, The Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, 18 U.C.C.
L.J. 195 (1986) (reporter's step-by-step guide to the UFTA).
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stream and cross-stream guaranties, and raise new issues pertaining to
the rights of creditors:
(1) The removal of a possible uncertainty with respect to the
valuation of guaranties in determining the liabilities of a transferor for
purposes of determining its "insolvency" or whether it has received
"reasonably equivalent value" in the UFTA's definitions of "asset"
and "claim" in sections 1(2)"s and 1(3).6
(2) The characterization in section 5(b) of certain "insider"
preferential transactions as fraudulent transfers,57 subject to certain
defenses and limitations of liability with respect to insider transfers
specified in section 8(f). 8
(3) The establishment in section 6(5) of a new standard for de-
termining the time that an "obligation," such as a guaranty, is in-
curred for purposes of the limitation periods governing UFTA-
created rights and remedies.5 9
(4) The adoption in section 9 of specified limitation periods for
commencing actions under the UFTA. °
A. Revised Definitions of "Asset" and "Claim"
In its definitions of "asset" and "claim" in sections 1(2) and
1(3),1 the UFTA removes a question that had been raised under the
UFCA (and the Bankruptcy Act) by some commentators regarding
the valuation of the liability represented by a guaranty for purposes of
determining "insolvency" and "reasonably equivalent value."' 62 The
55 U.F.T.A. § 1(2), 7A U.L.A. 644 (1985) (providing, subject to certain exceptions, that
"'[a]sset' means property of a debtor.").
56 Id. § 1(3) ("'Claim' means a right to payment, whether or not the right is reduced to
judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undis-
puted, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.").
Unfortunately, the UFTA's definitions of "asset" and "claim" leave another area which
was uncertain under the UFCA still unresolved. See infra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
57 7A U.L.A 657 (1985). Section 5(b) is the counterpart to section 547(b)(4) of the Code.
See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4) (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (certain transfers from "insiders" are voida-
ble preferences in bankruptcy); see also infra text accompanying note 94 (UFTA's definition of
"insider").
58 7A U.L.A. 662-63 (1985). See infra notes 122-25.
59 U.F.T.A. § 6(5), 7A U.L.A. 658-59 (1985).
60 Id. § 9, 7A U.L.A. 665.
61 See supra notes 55-56.
62 Compare Rosenberg, supra note 14, at 256-57 (a discount to reflect the likelihood of the
guaranty "besides doing violence to the statutory language" would add "another element of
uncertainty"); 2 H. Marsh, Jr., supra note 33, § 15.31, at 382-85; Nelson, Complex Leveraged
Transactions, in Leveraged Buyouts 275, 282 (P.L.I. Corp. L. & P. No. 393, 1982) ("full
amount of the guaranty is considered a liability") with Conner, Enforcing Commercial Guar-
anties in Texas: Vanishing Limitations, Remaining Questions, 12 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 785, 806-
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UFCA's definitions left the door open for interpretations that could
have seriously restricted the role of guaranties in financing.
As to creditors existing at the time of the transfer, "insolvency"
is the principal, although not exclusive, 63 standard under UFTA sec-
tions 5(a)6 and (b)65 for determining whether a transferor's financial
condition is such that a transfer otherwise falling within the UFTA or
the Code is fraudulent for purposes of the statute.66 Under the
UFTA, "[a] debtor is insolvent if the sum of the debtor's debts is
greater than all of the debtor's assets at a fair valuation. ' 67 This stan-
dard differs from the UFCA in two respects. In valuing assets, the
UFCA refers to "present fair salable value,"' 68 while the UFTA refers
to "fair valuation. '69 In computing liabilities, the UFCA refers to
"probable liability on ... existing debts as they become absolute and
matured,"7 whereas the UFTA eliminates "probable liability," and
contains an expanded, inclusive definition of a "claim" against the
debtor's estate.7
The issues arising under the UFCA and the Bankruptcy Act on
the valuation of guaranties for purposes of determining "insolvency"
were twofold. First, whether the guarantor's right of subrogation to
the creditor's rights against the primary obligor (or to any collateral
securing the obligation) and the guarantor's right to contribution
07 (198 1) (some commentators support the approach of "crafting reasonable discounts or as-
serting the present 'value' of subrogation rights").
There is a middle ground: if the guaranty is taken at full value, allowance must be made
for the rights of subrogation and contribution. See Wingert v. President Directors & Co., 41
F.2d 660, 662-63 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 871 (1930).
63 UFTA § 4(a)(2)(i) applies where the debtor "was engaged or was about to engage in a
business or a transaction for which the remaining assets of the debtor were unreasonably small
in relation to the business or transaction." U.F.T.A. § 4(a)(2)(i), 7A U.L.A. 653 (1985). Sec-
tion 4(a) applies where the debtor "intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have
believed that he [or she] would incur, debts beyond his [or her] ability to pay as they became
due." Id. § 4(a). Section 4(a)(2) also requires that "the debtor made the transfer or incurred
the obligation ... without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer
or obligation." Id. § 4(a)(2), 7A U.L.A. 652-53.
64 Id. § 5(a), 7A U.L.A. 657.
65 Id. § 5(b).
66 Actual intent "to hinder, delay, or defraud," id. § 4(a)(1), 7A U.L.A. 652, or "en-
gag[ing] in a business or a transaction for which the remaining assets. . . were unreasonably
small," id. § 4(a)(2)(i), 7A U.L.A. 653, or "intend[ing] to incur, or believed or reasonably
should have believed that he [or she] would incur, debts beyond his [or her] ability to pay as
they became due," id. § 4(a)(2)(ii), are supplemental standards applicable to future, as well as
present, creditors.
67 Id. § 2(a), 7A U.L.A. 648.
68 U.F.C.A. § 2(1), 7A U.L.A. 442 (1985).
69 U.F.T.A. § 2(a), 7A U.L.A. 648 (1985).
70 U.F.C.A. § 2(1), 7A U.L.A. 442 (1985).
71 U.F.T.A. § 1(3), 7A U.L.A. 639, 644 (1985). See supra note 56.
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from any co-guarantors were to be regarded as assets to be valued and
set off against the liability under the guaranty. 72 Second, whether in
determining the liabilities of a transferor, a guaranty should be listed
as a liability in the full amount of the indebtedness that it guaranteed,
or whether it should be listed in a lesser amount that recognized its
contingent nature and reflected an estimate of the probability that the
guarantor would be required to honor the guaranty. 73
1. Rights of Subrogation and Contribution
Numerous cases under the UFCA and the Bankruptcy Act, of
which Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co. v Goldman (In re Ollag
Construction Equipment Corp.)74 is the leading example, have held
that the guarantor's subrogation and contribution rights were to be
considered as assets in determining the solvency of a guarantor at the
time of issuing a guaranty.75 In an analogous area, decisions under
the Code have concluded that the debtor-guarantor's right of subroga-
tion against a solvent obligor could constitute "reasonably equivalent
value" for purposes of determining whether the transfers were fraudu-
lent under section 548 of the Code. 76 Nevertheless, other cases had
listed guaranties in the full principal amount without any deduction
for possible offsets for the rights of subrogation or contribution." In
72 See infra notes 74-80 and accompanying text.
73 See infra notes 81-86 and accompanying text.
74 578 F.2d 904 (2d Cir. 1978).
75 Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co. v. Goldman (In re Ollag Constr. Equip. Corp.), 578
F.2d 904 (2d Cir. 1978) (subrogation and contribution); Syracuse Eng'g Co. v. Haight, 97 F.2d
573 (2d Cir. 1938) (subrogation); Updike v. Oakland Motor Car Co., 53 F.2d 369 (2d Cir.
1931) (subrogation to collateral); Wingert v. President Directors & Co., 41 F.2d 660 (4th Cir.)
(subrogation and contribution), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 871 (1930); In re Bowers, 215 F. 617
(N.D. Ga. 1914) (right to contribution). See 2 Collier on Bankruptcy 1 101.31, at 101-54.12 to
101-54.13 (L. King 15th ed. 1987); Carl, supra note 53, at 129-34; Walls, Promises to Keep:
Intercorporate Guarantees and Fraudulent Transfers in Bankruptcy, 19 U.C.C. L.J. 219, 240-
42 (1987); cf. Schwartz v. Commissioner, 560 F.2d 311, 317 (8th Cir. 1977) (Internal Revenue
Code).
76 Emerald Hills Country Club, Inc. v. Hollywood, Inc. (In re Emerald Hills Country
Club, Inc.), 32 Bankr. 408, 420 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1983); Howco Leasing Corp. v. Alexander
Dispos-Haul Sys., Inc. (In re Alexander Dispos-Haul Sys., Inc.), 36 Bankr. 612, 616 (Bankr.
D. Or. 1983); In re Nelsen, 24 Bankr. 701, 702 (D. Or. 1982). Cf. Join-In Int'l (U.S.A.) v.
New York Wholesale Distribs. Corp. (In re Join-In Int'l (U.S.A.)), 56 Bankr. 555, 560 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1986) (all factors of a transaction must be considered); Barrv. Weber (In re Carousel
Candy Co.), 38 Bankr. 927, 937 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1984) (where defendant's attorneys were
aware of, and ignored, the existence of creditors, they were "insiders," and the transfer, made
when the debtor was insolvent, was deemed fraudulent). But cf. Ear, Nose & Throat Surgeons,
Inc. v. Guaranty Bank & Trust Co. (In re Ear Nose & Throat Surgeons, Inc.), 49 Bankr. 316,
320 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1985) (where debtor was rendered insolvent by the transactions in ques-
tion, creditor-bank could set aside debtor's guaranty of its president's loan and security
agreement).
77 E.g., Huttig Mfg. Co. v. Edwards, 160 F. 619 (8th Cir. 1908); Moister v. Waters (In re
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addition, a leading commentator contended that treatment of the sub-
rogation right as a contingent asset was unrealistic.7"
The UFTA has brought this debate to an end insofar as state law
is concerned. In defining an "asset" as "property of a debtor" 9 with-
out regard to whether the property was liable for the debts of the
debtor, the draftsmen of the UFTA made it plain that contingent
claims were to be included as assets. The official comment to section
1(2) states that "a contingent claim of a surety for reimbursement,
contribution, or subrogation may be counted as an asset." 80
2. Discounted Probability
Although under UFCA section 2(l)'s reference to "probable lia-
bility,"81 courts appeared to be under a statutory direction to make
some adjustment or discount of the principal amount of a guaranty to
reflect the probability of ultimate payment by the primary obligor, the
courts have been divided. Some recognize the need for a discount or
adjustment when it might be reasonably anticipated that the obligor
would be able to pay on maturity.82 More frequently, however, courts
list the guaranty at its full amount without looking into the question
of probability. 83 Commentators also disagree on the matter.84
Unfortunately, the UFTA does not resolve this controversy. In
place of the UFCA's standard of "probable liability," UFTA section
1(3) defines "claim" as "a right to payment, whether or not the right
is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent,
matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured,
or unsecured."" 5 If anything, the elimination of "probable" and the
expanded inclusiveness of the UFTA definition weaken the argument
for asserting that the probability of payment of the obligation by the
primary obligor should support an adjustment or discount in appro-
priate cases. The matter, however, is not foreclosed, and the debate
should continue. Nevertheless, it seems clear, notwithstanding the ul-
Waters), 8 Bankr. 163 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981); Zellerbach Paper Co. v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 13
Ariz. App. 431, 477 P.2d 550 (1970); Marine Midland Bank v. Stein, 105 Misc. 2d 768, 433
N.Y.S.2d 325 (Sup. Ct. 1980).
78 See Rosenberg, supra note 14, at 256.
79 U.F.T.A. § 1(2), 7A U.L.A. 644 (1985).
80 Id. § I comment 2, 7A U.L.A. 645 (1985).
81 U.F.C.A. § 2(1), 7A U.L.A. 442 (1985).
82 Cate v. Nicely (In re Knox Kreations, Inc.), 474 F. Supp. 567, 571-72 (E.D. Tenn.
1979), affd in part, rev'd in part, 656 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1981); Ayers v. Harrell, Ill Ga. 864,
36 S.E. 946 (1900) (per curiam).
83 See cases cited supra note 77.
84 See supra note 62.
85 U.F.T.A. § 1(3), 7A U.L.A. 644 (1985).
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timate outcome of the meaning to be given to the statutory term, that
a guaranty will not be carried as a liability in any amount upon a
showing that the underlying obligation has in fact been paid or that
the primary obligor was clearly able to meet the obligation.86 The
failure of the UFTA to resolve this matter is a disappointment.
B. Transfers-to "Insiders"
Guaranties of insider obligations give rise to a series of important
problems under the fraudulent transfer provisions of the UFTA and
the Code.87 Two of these problems involve a debtor's issuance of a
guaranty or payment pursuant to its guaranty for the benefit of an
affiliated obligor: (1) whether the issuance of an upstream or a cross-
stream guaranty by a debtor of an obligation of an affiliated obligor
constitutes a fraudulent transfer by the debtor-guarantor to the affili-
ated obligor;8" and (2) whether the payment by a debtor-guarantor
honoring its guaranty of the obligation of an affiliated obligor consti-
tutes a fraudulent transfer by the debtor-guarantor to the affiliated
obligor.
Two other problems involve an affiliate's issuance of a guaranty
or payment pursuant to its guaranty for the benefit of a debtor-obli-
gor: (1) whether the issuance of an upstream or cross-stream guar-
anty by one affiliated corporation of the indebtedness of another
affiliated debtor-corporation constitutes a fraudulent transfer for the
benefit of the debtor; and (2) whether the payment by one affiliated
corporation of the obligation of a debtor-affiliate pursuant to its up-
stream or cross-stream guaranty constitutes a fraudulent transfer for
the benefit of the debtor.
The final problem relates to the status of an unrelated creditor
that is the recipient of a fraudulent intragroup transfer: Whether the
86 Cf. Moister v. Waters (In re Waters), 8 Bankr. 163, 167 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981) (refus-
ing to include a guaranty as an indebtedness absent showing that obligor had failed to pay it).
87 The literature dealing with the interrelationship of guaranties, fraudulent transfers and
voidable preferences, particularly under the Code, is extensive. See, e.g., Carl, supra note 53;
Pitts, Insider Guaranties and the Law of Preferences, 55 Am. Bankr. L.J. 343 (1981); Walls,
supra note 75; Note, Section 548(a)(2), supra note 14.
88 An "actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud" may constitute a fraudulent transfer
without regard to the financial condition of the debtor. U.F.T.A. § 4(a)(1), 7A U.L.A. 652
(1985). This Article excludes such cases from consideration.
The issuance of a downstream guaranty by a parent corporation does not present the same
problem in view of the proprietary interest of the parent in the subsidiary. The additional
liability incurred by the parent is offset by a comparable increase in the value of its equity
interest. Therefore, the downstream guaranty is similar to a capital contribution to the subsid-
iary. Accordingly, downstream guaranties may generally be ignored in this context. Where,




payment by an affiliate, either of the obligation of an affiliated debtor-
obligor or of its own obligation guaranteed by an affiliated debtor-
guarantor, that constitutes a fraudulent transfer to the affiliate debtor
also constitutes a transfer that is recoverable from the creditor.
Thus, a review of the UFTA's impact on guaranties must also
include an inquiry into the provisions of the statute that deal solely
with transfers, excluding obligations or guaranties, in order to deal
with transfers in payment of guaranteed indebtedness that may repre-
sent a fraudulent transfer to the guarantor. One such provision is
section 5(b).19
1. Section 5(b) and Related Provisions
One of the UFTA's most noteworthy changes is section 5(b),
which deals with insider preferential transfers. 90 In the same way that
section 547(b)(4) of the Code, dealing with insider voidable prefer-
ences, supplements the fraudulent transfer provisions of section 548,
section 5(b) supplements the provisions of UFTA section 4(b). It ren-
ders a transfer fraudulent as to present creditors when the transfer
was "made to an insider for an antecedent debt, [and] the debtor was
insolvent at that time, and the insider had reasonable cause to believe
that the debtor was insolvent." 91 The transfer is voidable even where
the antecedent debt represents "reasonably equivalent value." 92
Following sections 10 1(2), 25(B) and 25(E) of the Code,93 UFTA
sections 1(7)(ii)(C) and 1(7)(iv) broadly define "insider" to include "a
person in control," an "affiliate," and an "insider" of an "affiliate." '94
Section 1(1) defines "affiliate" equally broadly to include any person
entitled by ownership or control or power to vote twenty percent or
more of voting stock.95 The comprehensive definitions of "insider"
and "affiliate" clearly include every constituent company of a corpo-
rate group-parent, subsidiaries, and sister subsidiaries-and thus lay
the groundwork for the application of the UFTA to upstream, cross-
stream, and downstream guaranties and transactions.96
89 U.F.T.A. § 5(a), 7A U.L.A. 657 (1985).
90 Id. § 5(b).
91 U.F.T.A. § 5(b), 7A U.L.A. 657 (1985).
92 See Alces & Dorr, supra note 54, at 544. If the transferee provides adequate new value,
UFTA § 8(f)(1) provides that § 5(b) is inapplicable. See U.F.T.A. § 8(f)(1), 7A U.L.A. 662-
63 (1985).
93 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(2), (25)(B), (25)(E), (28)(B), (28)(E) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
94 U.F.T.A. §§ 1(7)(ii)(C), 1(7)(iv), 7A U.L.A. 644-45 (1985).
95 Id. § 1(1), 7A U.L.A. 643 (1985).




2. Restrictions of Section 5(b) to Transfers, Excluding Guaranties
UFTA section 5(b) refers only to a "transfer." This section con-
trasts vividly with its companion sections relating to fraudulent trans-
actions, i.e., sections 4(a) and 5(a), which more broadly refer to "[a]
transfer made or obligation incurred."' 97 With the issuance of a guar-
anty, the guarantor incurs an obligation,9" but no transfer takes place.
A transfer takes place only when the guarantor or some other party
makes a payment in reduction of the indebtedness that has been guar-
anteed. 99 Thus, it is clear that the issuance of a guaranty is not in-
cluded in section 5(b) although payments pursuant to the guaranty
are, of course, included. 10°
Although section 5(b) does not include the issuance of a guaranty
by a debtor, UFTA section 4 includes "obligations" and, therefore,
the issuance of guaranties.101 Section 4(a)(1) applies if the debtor "in-
curred the obligation: (1) with actual intent to hinder, delay, or de-
fraud any creditor."' 1 2 Section 4(a)(2) applies if
the debtor... incurred the obligation:
(2) without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange
for the transfer or obligation, and the debtor:
(i) was engaged or was about to engage in a business or a
transaction for which the remaining assets of the debtor were un-
reasonably small in relation to the business or transaction; or
(ii) intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have
believed that he [or she] would incur, debts beyond his [or her]
97 U.F.T.A. §§ 4(a), 5(a), 7A U.L.A. 652-53, 657 (1985) (emphasis added).
98 Although contingent liabilities, guaranties have been held to constitute "obligations in-
curred" under the UFCA. See, e.g., United States v. Gleneagles Inv. Co., 565 F. Supp. 556,
576 (M.D. Pa. 1983) (although not borrowers, guarantors nevertheless incur an obligation),
modified on other grounds sub. nom. United States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d
1288 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3229 (1987); Zellerbach Paper Co. v. Valley Nat'l
Bank, 13 Ariz. App. 431, 433-34, 477 P.2d 550, 552-53 (1970) ("a person is insolvent when the
present fair salable value of his assets is less than the amount that will be required to pay his
probable liability on his existing debts as they become absolute and matured"); Roxbury State
Bank v. The Clarendon, 129 N.J. Super. 358, 376-77, 324 A.2d 24, 33 ("A guaranty is an
agreement to be answerable personally for the debt of another."), cert. denied, 66 N.J. 316, 331
A.2d 16 (1974).
99 Transfer is defined to include "every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional,
voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with an asset or an interest in an asset, and
includes payment of money, release, lease, and creation of a lien or other encumbrance."
U.F.T.A. § 1(12), 7A U.L.A. 645 (1985).
'0 The Official Comment and the Reporter's Note to the UFTA do not discuss the reason
for the omission, but the explanation is obvious in light of the origin of § 5(b), which is dis-
cussed supra notes 166-84 and accompanying text. See Kennedy, supra note 54.
101 U.F.T.A. § 4, 7A U.L.A. 652 (1985).
102 Id. § 4(a)(1).
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ability to pay as they became due. 103
Section 4 makes such transfers or the incurring of such obligations
fraudulent as to both present and future creditors."o
Section 5(b) differs from section 4(a)(2) in that it extends protec-
tion only to present creditors and utilizes the test of whether the
debtor was or became insolvent. 0 5 As emphasized by the Second Cir-
cuit in Rubin v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co.," ° 6 in the closely
analogous area of the Bankruptcy Act, the statutory test for solvency
related solely to the financial position of the debtor." 7 While the sol-
vency of the debtor's affiliates or the group as a whole may be helpful
in ascertaining the financial soundness of the debtor, the question for
determination is the solvency of the debtor, not of the enterprise of
which it may be a part.'08
As noted, UFTA section 2(a) employs the bankruptcy definition
of insolvency.109 However, in a departure from both the UFCA and
the Code, UFTA section 2(b) also includes the equity definition of
insolvency, providing that "[a] debtor who is generally not paying his
[or her] debts as they become due is presumed to be insolvent.""10
Thus, the omission of guaranties from section 5(b) is significant only
in the case of the issuance of a guaranty by a corporation that is insol-
vent under the statutory bankruptcy standard but which does not fall
within section 4(a)(2), either as a debtor with "unreasonably small...
remaining assets" or as a debtor that satisfies the statutory test with
respect to incurring debts beyond his (or her) ability to pay as they
become due. Although there will, no doubt, be such companies, there
should not be many, because a corporation whose liabilities exceed its
assets will usually not be able to escape both the "unreasonably small
... remaining assets" test and the equity-insolvency test. The omis-
sion of guaranties from section 5(b), although undesirable, should not
be regarded as creating any serious gap in the statutory scheme.
3. The Origins of Section 5(b)
The origins of section 5(b) are reasonably clear. Section 5(b) is
103 Id. § 4(a)(2), 7A U.L.A. 652-53 (1985).
'04 Id. § 4, 7A U.L.A. 652 (1985).
105 See id. § 5(b), 7A U.L.A. 657 (1985).
106 661 F.2d 979 (2d Cir. 1981).
107 Id. at 995.
108 Id.
109 The Code provides that an "entity" is "insolvent" when the sum of its "debts is greater
than all of such entity's property, at a fair valuation." 11 U.S.C. § 101(29)(A) (Supp. III
1985).
I 10 U.F.T.A. § 2(b), 7A U.L.A. 648 (1985).
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derived from section 547(b)(4) of the Code which provides that cer-
tain insider transfers constitute voidable preferences."' Section
547(b)(4) also omits any reference to obligations (or to guaranties). It
was inserted to fill the gap created by the change in the fraudulent
transfer provisions of section 548 of the Code from the fraudulent
transfer provisions of the Bankruptcy Act." 2
Section 548(a)(2)(A) of the Code employs "reasonably equivalent
value" as the standard for the adequacy of consideration in determin-
ing whether certain transfers are fraudulent." 3 It replaces "fair con-
sideration," the standard used in section 67d(2)(a) of the Bankruptcy
Act , 4 and in UFCA sections 3 and 4." 1
"Good faith" was an essential component of "fair considera-
tion," and numerous cases under the Bankruptcy Act and the UFCA
held that transfers for the benefit of insiders were fraudulent for lack
of good faith even though the consideration was otherwise ade-
quate. 1 6 The substitution of "reasonably equivalent value" for "fair
consideration" and the resulting elimination of the "good faith" re-
quirement accordingly created a gap in the statutory scheme. To deal
with this problem, section 547(b) of the Code provides that certain
transfers to an insider "for or on account of an antecedent debt" are
voidable preferences even though they may not be fraudulent trans-
fers as, for example, where the antecedent debt constituted "reason-
ably equivalent value."'" 7
The structure of the UFTA is much the same. UFTA section
4(a) followed section 548(a)(2)(A) of the Code in adopting the "rea-
sonably equivalent value" standard for fraudulent transfers in place of
the "fair consideration" standard used. by sections 3 and 4 of the
UFCA and section 67d(2)(a) of the Bankruptcy Act. The drafters
therefore faced the same problem with respect to the elimination of
III 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4) (1982 & Supp. 111 1985).
112 See Kennedy, supra note 54, at 204-05.
113 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1982 & Supp. II 1985).
114 11 U.S.C. § 107d(2) (1976) (repealed).
ItI U.F.C.A. §§ 3-4, 7A U.L.A. 448, 474 (1985).
116 E.g., Midland Supply Co. v. American Drilling Co., 302 F.2d 128 (10th Cir. 1962);
Cohen v. Sutherland, 257 F.2d 737, 742 (2d Cir. 1958); Epstein v. Goldstein, 107 F.2d 755,
757 (2d Cir. 1939); United States v. Gleneagles Inv. Co., 565 F. Supp. 556, 574 (M.D. Pa.
1983), modified on other grounds sub nom. United States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803
F.2d 1288 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3229 (1987); Seligson v. New York Produce
Exch., 378 F. Supp. 1076 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); In re Messenger, 32 F. Supp. 490, 494 (E.D. Pa.
1940); Bergquist v. First Nat'l Bank (In re American Lumber Co.), 5 Bankr. 470 (D. Minn.
1980). See Levin, An Introduction to the Trustee's Avoiding Powers, 53 Am. Bankr. L.J. 173,
180-81 (1979); Normandin, supra note 3, at 375-77; Note, Good Faith and Fraudulent Con-
veyances, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 495, 503-09 (1983).
117 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
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the "good faith" element that had arisen in the Code. As recognized
by the reporter," 8 if a section like 5(b) had not been inserted, insider
preferential transfers would have been invulnerable in light of the
changes in section 4."9
Section 5(b) was modelled after section 547(b)(4) of the Code us-
ing comparable language in an attempt to protect the debtor's estate
against depletion. However, since it is a part of a statute dealing with
fraudulent transfers, it treats such transfers for the benefit of insiders
as fraudulent transfers, whereas section 547(b)(4) of the Code treats
them as voidable preferences.
Section 547 refers only to transfers and does not refer to the in-
curring of obligations or guaranties for the benefit of insiders. Section
547 of the Code deals with voidable preferences. Since a preference
can only arise as a result of a payment or other transfer in reduction
of an antecedent debt, the innovative provisions of section 547 relat-
ing to actions for the benefit of insiders inevitably referred only to
transfers. This structural problem does not arise under UFTA section
5(b), which deals with fraudulent transfers not preferences, and could
have included obligations and guaranties just as its predecessor enact-
ment, UFCA section 4, had done. However, it failed to do so. It is
not evident why this omission occurred. One possible explanation is
the not unnatural desire of the draftsmen to have the UFTA corre-
spond to the Code's provisions as much as possible. Another is the
fact that section 5(b) was adopted very late in the process. As late as
November 1983, the UFTA draft contained no provision derived in
any way from section 547(b)(4). Section 5(b) was apparently added in
the final preparation of the definitive draft for submission to the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, where it
was approved on August 3, 1984.120 Accordingly, section 5(b) ap-
I IS See Kennedy, supra note 54, at 204.
119 The problem arose as a result of the adoption of the "reasonably equivalent value" stan-
dard in the Code, 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1982) and U.F.T.A. § 4(a)(2), 7A U.L.A. 652-53 (1985) in
place of the "fair consideration" standard previously used in the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C.
§ 67d (1976) (repealed 1978), and U.F.C.A. § 4, 7A U.L.A. 474 (1985). In the absence of
§ 547(b)(4) of the Code and UFTA § 5(b), a transfer by an insolvent to an insider in payment
of an antecedent debt would no longer have been voidable because such transfers had previ-
ously been voidable only because they had not satisfied the "good faith" test implicit in the
"fair consideration" standard. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
120 The draft of § 5(b) was restricted to a limited class of insider transfers: a transfer of
substantially all of a debtor's assets to a lienor in satisfaction of a lien, and the lienor's re-
transfer to an insider of the debtor. U.F.T.A. § 5(b) (Nov. 23, 1983 draft).
Section 3 of the November 23, 1983 draft also contained an innovative provision that
would have strengthened the status of intragroup guaranties. It provided that: "An obligation
to pay the debt of another who has received value in exchange for the debt is incurred for an
equivalent value if there is a community of interest between the obligor and the beneficiary of
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pears to be a belated recognition that some provision of general appli-
cation was necessary in order to deal with the insider preferential
transfer problem.
4. Defenses to Insider Transfers
UFTA section 8(f) creates certain defenses and limitations of lia-
bility, excluding from the provisions of section 5(b) certain insider
transfers that would otherwise fall under its provisions. It provides,
in pertinent part, as follows:
A transfer is not voidable under Section 5(b):
(1) to the extent the insider gave new value ... unless the
new value was secured by a valid lien;
(2) if made in the ordinary course of business or financial
affairs of the debtor and the insider; or
(3) if made pursuant to a good-faith effort to rehabilitate the
debtor and the transfer secured present value given for that pur-
pose as well as an antecedent debt of the debtor. 2 '
Sections 8(f)(1) and 8(f)(2)' are derived from sections
547(c)(4)(A) and 547(c)(2)(C) of the Code, 23 respectively. Section
8(f)(3), 124 however, is a notable change that commendably breaks
new statutory ground. As noted in the official comment, section
8(f)(3) "reflects a policy judgment that an insider who has previously
extended credit to a debtor should not be deterred from extending
further credit to the debtor in a good faith effort to save the debtor
from a forced liquidation in bankruptcy or otherwise." 125 Since it is
useful to encourage continued financial support on the part of insiders
of enterprises undergoing financial difficulties in order to increase the
struggling firm's chances for survival, a statutory standard that ren-
dered such support vulnerable to avoidance as a fraudulent transfer
was manifestly counterproductive.
the obligation." U.F.T.A. § 3 (Nov. 23, 1983 draft) (emphasis added). It was recognized that
this draft provision was not entirely satisfactory. See Letter from Frank R. Kennedy, Re-
porter, to the Members of the Drafting Committee for the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act
(Aug. 18, 1983) at 13 ("This addition, no doubt, raises new questions and certainly does not
resolve all the old questions that surround this subsection."). The provision was omitted in the
definitive draft.
121 U.F.T.A. § 8(f), 7A U.L.A. 662-63 (1985).
122 Id. §§ 8(f)(I)-(2), 7A U.L.A. 663 (1985).
123 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2)(C), (4)(A) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
124 U.F.T.A. § 8(f)(3), 7A U.L.A. 663 (1985).
125 Id. § 8 comment 6, 7A U.L.A. 665 (1985).
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5. Other Differences between Section 5(b) and Section 547(b)(4) of
the Code
Although UFTA section 5(b) is generally derived from section
547(b)(4) of the Code, substantially duplicating the Code's more im-
portant provisions, there are a number of significant differences,
including:
(a) different standards for establishing "insolvency;"
(b) different requirements with respect to the insider's "reason-
able cause to believe" the debtor was insolvent;
(c) the omission of any reference to indirect transfers;
(d) a slightly different limitation period for the institution of
actions; and
(e) the existence of judicial gloss with respect to voidable pref-
erences restricting the enforcement of section 547(b)(4) and the ab-
sence of any such judicial standard in the enforcement of section 5(b).
a. Different Standards for Establishing Insolvency
UFTA section 5(b) and section 547(b) of the Code both require
that the debtor be insolvent at the time of the transfer for the transfer
to be deemed fraudulent. The statutes differ, however, with respect to
proof of insolvency. Section 547(f) of the Code presumes insolvency
in the case of transfers during the ninety-day period prior to the filing
of the bankruptcy petition and imposes the burden of proof on the
trustee in the case of transfers occurring more than ninety days but
less than one year prior to the filing. 126 The UFTA requires the
trustee to prove insolvency in all cases. However, in a novel provision
that has no counterpart in either the Code 127 or the Bankruptcy Act,
UFTA section 2(b) provides: "A debtor who is generally not paying
his [or her] debts as they become due is presumed to be insolvent."1 28
This presumption is rebuttable. It was inserted "in recognition of the
difficulties typically imposed on a creditor in proving insolvency in
the bankruptcy sense."' 29 Thus, the evidentiary burdens in establish-
ing a debtor's failure generally to pay debts as they become due and
payable in many cases is substantially less demanding than the valua-
126 11 U.S.C. § 547(f) (1982). See 4 Collier on Bankruptcy 547.28, at 547-109 (L. King
15th ed. 1987).
127 In one section, the Code provides that in the case of an involuntary petition, the court
shall order relief only if "(1) the debtor is generally not paying such debtor's debts as such
debts become due .. " See 11 U.S.C. § 303(h)(1) (Supp. III 1985). This equity standard of
bankruptcy, however, is not employed elsewhere in the Code.
128 U.F.T.A. § 2(b), 7A U.L.A. 648 (1985).
129 Id. § 2 comment (2), 7A U.L.A 648-49 (1985).
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tion of assets required for implementation of the bankruptcy standard
of insolvency.
b. Insider's "Reasonable Cause to Believe"
Section 5(b) requires not only that the debtor be insolvent but
that the insider have "reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was
insolvent." a1 30 This provision is much the same as the original section
547(b)(4) of the Code, which required that the insider have "reason-
able cause to believe" in the case of transfers occurring more than
ninety days but less than one year prior to the filing of the bankruptcy
petition. 3 1 There was no such requirement, however, either for credi-
tors generally or for insiders in the case of transfers made within
ninety days of the petition. 3 2 However, in 1984 the Code was
amended and the "reasonable cause" provision was deleted. Since the
1984 amendment, section 547(b) has contained no such provision.
The Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, aa
accomplishing this change, became law on July 10, 1984. The Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ap-
proved the UFTA on August 3, 1984.134 There obviously had not
been enough time to respond to the change in the Code, even if the
draftsmen had been so minded. As a result, this unfortunate differ-
ence between the Code and UFTA exists.
The inclusion of a provision in the UFTA with respect to "rea-
sonable cause to believe" has been criticized as unrealistic on the well-
grounded assertion that insiders will inevitably be well informed of
the debtor's condition. 35 By the same token, however, the amend-
ment should make little difference in the typical case. In the corpo-
rate group, it would be a most unusual case in which corporate
management could successfully assert that it lacked information
about the financial condition of the component companies of the
group.13 6 Although the difference between the Code and the UFTA is
undesirable as a matter of principle, it does not seem particularly im-
portant. Further, in view of the wide attribution rules for determining
130 Id. § 5(b), 7A U.L.A. 657 (1985).
131 Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 547(b)(4), 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C.
§ 547(b)(4) (1982 & Supp III 1985)).
132 This provision in the Code was derived from section 60b of the Bankruptcy Act which
required that "reasonable cause to believe" be shown in all cases. 11 U.S.C. § 60b (1976)
(repealed 1978).
133 Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 462(b)(2), 98 Stat. 333 (1984).
134 See Kennedy, supra note 54, at 195.
135 See Alces & Dorr, supra note 54, at 553.
136 See P. Blumberg, Corporate Groups: Bankruptcy, supra note 6, § 9.11, at 389.
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insiders,"3 7 the provisions of section 5(b) may serve some useful pur-
poses in isolated cases affecting individuals within family
corporations. 38
c. Omission of Reference to Indirect Transfers
There is a puzzling departure in the language of UFTA section
5(b) from the comparable language in section 547(b) of the Code.
Section 5(b) refers only to "transfers made to an insider,"', 39 and thus
pointedly departs from the more inclusive standard in section 547(b)
which refers to "any transfer ... (1) to or for the benefit of a creditor
• . . (4) made ... (B) . .. if such creditor... (i) was an insider."'"
Section 60b of the Bankruptcy Act had similarly referred to "a trans-
fer ... to or for the benefit of a creditor."' 14' What is the significance
of the omission of the critical reference to "or for the benefit of a[n
insider] creditor?"' 42
d. Period of Limitation
UFTA section 9(c) adopts a special one-year limitation period
for instituting actions with respect to transfers allegedly fraudulent
under section 5(b).' 4 3 This limitation period can be contrasted with
the four-year period established by the UFTA for fraudulent transfers
generally.'" On initial inquiry, the one-year period in section 9(c)
appears to correspond to the one-year period in section 547(b)(4)(B)
of the Code during which preferential transfers to insiders are avoida-
ble. However, the UFTA one-year period in some cases may be dis-
tinctly more liberal than the one-year period under the Code. The
period under the Code is absolutely fixed by the dates of the transfer
and the filing of the petition. The commencement of the UFTA one-
year period, however, like all periods of limitation, may be tolled
under appropriate circumstances. It should be noted that section 9(a)
137 In the case of corporations, U.F.T.A. § 1(7)(ii), 7A U.L.A. 644 (1985) includes as an
"insider," a director, an officer, a "person in control," a related partnership and its general
partners, or "a relative of a general partner, director, officer or person in control of the
debtor."
1-38 See, e.g., Consove v. Cohen (In re Roco Corp.), 15 Bankr. 813 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1981),
aff'd in part, vacated in part, 21 Bankr. 429 (Bankr. 1st Cir. 1982), aff'd, 701 F.2d 978 (1st
Cir. 1983) (father in retirement in Florida held not to have "reasonable cause to believe" insol-
vency of family corporation managed by son in New York).
139 U.F.T.A. § 5(b), 7A U.L.A. 657 (1985).
140 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (emphasis added).
141 11 U.S.C. § 60b (1976) (repealed 1978).
142 This problem of construction is discussed infra notes 147-64 and accompanying text
(addressing transfers in payment of guaranteed indebtedness).
143 U.F.T.A. § 9(c), 7A U.L.A. 665 (1985).
144 Id. §§ 9(a), (b).
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provides a special tolling provision with respect to transfers under sec-
tion 4(a)(1) dealing with transfers with "actual intent to hinder, delay,
or defraud." This provision is not contained in section 9(b) dealing
with transfers under section 4(a)(2) nor in section 9(c) dealing with
transfers under section 5(b). The official comment sheds no light on
the significance of the omission of any special tolling provision in sec-
tions 9(b) and (c). Thus, whether the drafters intended-by the refer-
ence in section 9(a)-to exclude tolling of the limitation period in the
latter sections according to traditional judicial standards is an open
question. If the statute is so construed to permit such tolling, there
will be cases in which the UFTA period will be extended beyond one
year and thus depart from the fixed one-year period in the Code.
e. Differing Application of Judicial Gloss on Voidable Preferences
In still another area the UFTA may differ from the Code. Sec-
tion 547(b) of the Code treats an insider preferential transfer as a void-
able preference, not as a fraudulent transfer. This characterization of
an insider preferential transfer brings into play certain judicial doc-
trines limiting the application of statutory provisions applicable to
voidable preferences that have no application to fraudulent transfers.
Thus, under the judicial gloss, notwithstanding the statutory provi-
sion, a preference is not voidable unless the transfer violates the policy
of "equality among creditors" and enables the creditor to receive
more than he would otherwise be entitled. 145 The UFTA, treats in-
sider preferential transfers as fraudulent transfers rather than as void-
able preferences and has no comparable limiting judicial doctrine to
bring about the same result.
6. Application of Section 5(b) to Transfers Involving Insiders and
Guaranteed Indebtedness
Transfers involving insiders and guaranteed indebtedness may in-
volve debtors in a number of ways: (a) a debtor-obligor may pay ante-
cedent indebtedness guaranteed by an insider; 4 6 (b) a debtor-
guarantor may pay antecedent indebtedness of an insider; (c) an in-
sider-guarantor may pay antecedent indebtedness of the debtor; or (d)
an insider-obligor may pay its own antecedent indebtedness guaran-
teed by the debtor. A question arises as to when such transactions
constitute insider preferential transfers subject to avoidance under
section 5(b).
145 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(5) (1982). See Nimmer, Security Interests in Bankruptcy: An Over-
view of Section 547 of the Code, 17 Hous. L. Rev. 289, 292 (1980).
146 This situation occurs most often.
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A further question relates to the position of a third-party creditor
who holds the antecedent indebtedness that is the subject of the fore-
going transfers. If the transfer is subject to avoidance as a voidable
preferential transfer to an insider, what is the position of the creditor?
These questions are reviewed in the succeeding sections.
a. Transfers by a Debtor-Obligor in Payment of Debt Guaranteed
by an Insider
Does a transfer by a debtor-obligor in payment of an antecedent
debt guaranteed by an insider represent a fraudulent transfer to the
insider? Under the UFCA and the Bankruptcy Act, such transfers
benefiting the insider-guarantor by reduction of the indebtedness on
which it was secondarily liable could not satisfy the "good faith" fac-
tor in "fair consideration." Accordingly, they were routinely held to
constitute fraudulent transfers under UFCA sections 3 and 4 and sec-
tion 67d(2)(a) of the Bankruptcy Act.'47
As noted, under the UFTA, "fair consideration" has been elimi-
nated with the substitution of "reasonably equivalent value," and
"good faith" is no longer a factor. The fraudulent transfer provisions
of section 4(a)(2) which employ the "reasonably equivalent value"
standard do not include such transfers where the satisfaction of an
antecedent debt represents "reasonably equivalent value." No deple-
tion of the estate has occurred.
Section 5(b), we have seen, was added to deal with the resulting
gap in the statute lest "preferential transfers to insiders [became] in-
vulnerable to avoidance"1 48 in much the same way that section 547(b)
making such transfers voidable preferences was inserted in the Code
to deal with the similar gap resulting from the substitution of "reason-
ably equivalent value" for "fair consideration" in the enactment of
section 548. Under section 547(b) such payments are voidable prefer-
ences.'49 A guarantor is a creditor for purposes of the Code,150 and a
payment by a debtor that reduces the liability of the guarantor consti-
tutes a preference. 5' Does section 5(b) apply where the debtor makes
147 See supra notes 115 and 119.
148 See U.F.T.A. § 5 comment 2, 7A U.L.A. 639, 658 (1985); Kennedy, supra note 54, at
205.
149 See supra text accompanying note 145.
150 11 U.S.C. § 101(9) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). See Keystone Automotive Warehouse Inc.
v. LaBonte (In re LaBonte), 13 Bankr. 887, 891 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1981); Notes of Comm. on
Judiciary, S. Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1978) ("A guarantor of... a claim against
the debtor is also a creditor, because he holds a contingent claim against the debtor that be-
comes fixed when he pays the creditor whose claim he has guaranteed.").
151 Kapela v. Newman, 649 F.2d 887, 890 n.3 (1st Cir. 1981); Pennington v. Leff, 183 F.
Supp. 884 (S.D. Ala. 1960); Armstrong v. Marine Bank Dane County (In re Prescott), 51
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a transfer in payment of the guaranteed obligation to a creditor who is
a third party, and not an insider, but which benefits the insider
through the reduction of the indebtedness on which the insider-guar-
antor is secondarily liable?
Section 5(b) does not refer to such third-party transfers. It
speaks only of a "transfer ... made to an insider for an antecedent
debt.' "52 In contrast, section 547(b), which otherwise served as the
model for section 5(b),15 3 expressly refers to "any transfer ... (1) to or
for the benefit of a[n insider] creditor."' 154 In the face of this signifi-
cant omission, the following question arises: Does section 5(b) in-
clude transfers to third parties of antecedent debt guaranteed by an
insider?
At first, it would seem difficult to conclude that the draftsmen of
the UFTA who were faithfully following the very structure and lan-
guage of section 547(b) of the Code in drafting UFTA section 5(b)
were simply inadvertent in their omission of the crucial phrase "or for
the benefit of," especially since it appears that they were otherwise
tracking the language of section 547(b). Traditional rules of statutory
construction would conclude that as a result of the omission of the
phrase, the manifest intent was to exclude transfers to third parties.
Nevertheless, however appealing such a construction might seem in
the ordinary case, it does not seem sound in the instant case for a
number of reasons.
First, such a substantive change would be major. Yet, there is
not a syllable of reference to such an intention in the comprehensive
and informative official comment. Nor does the reporter refer to any
such substantive change in his careful review of the newly adopted
Bankr. 751 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1985), aft'd, 805 F.2d 719 (7th Cir. 1986) (reversing part of
unpublished district court opinion and reinstating bankruptcy court's decision); Levit v. Mel-
rose Park Nat'l Bank (In re V.N. Deprizio Constr. Co.), 58 Bankr. 478 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1986); Mixon v. Anderson (In re Ozark Restaurant Equip. Co.), 41 Bankr. 476 (Bankr. W.D.
Ark. 1984), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 61 Bankr. 750 (W.D. Ark. 1986), aff'd, 816 F.2d 1222
(8th Cir. 1987); Mixon v. Mid-Continent Sys., Inc. (In Re Big Three Transp., Inc.), 41 Bankr.
16 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1984); McColley v. Matmom Gem Co. (In re Candor Diamond Corp.),
44 Bankr. 195 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984); Marketing Resources Int'l Corp. v PTC Corp. (In re
Marketing Resources Int'l Corp.), 41 Bankr. 575 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984); Schmitt v. Equibank
(In re R.A. Beck Builders, Inc.), 34 Bankr. 888, 892 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1983); Backhus v. Cent.
Trust Co. (In re Duccilli Formal Wear, Inc.), 24 Bankr. 699, 700 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982).
See H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 309-10 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong.
& Admin. News 5963, 6266-67; 4 Collier on Bankruptcy 547.04, at 547-30 (L. King 15th ed.
1987).
152 U.F.T.A. § 5(b), 7A U.L.A. 657 (1985).
153 See supra notes 111-20 and accompanying text.
154 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(1) (1982).
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UFTA. "'55 If such a change had been intended, it is most unlikely that
it would have been made without some explanation.
Second, such a change would have been inconsistent with the evi-
dent policy underlying section 5(b). Section 5(b) was intended to pro-
scribe transfers that had been previously rendered fraudulent by the
"good faith" standard of "fair consideration" and to supplement the
"reasonably equivalent value" standard of section 4(a)(2) in the same
way that the comparable provisions of section 547 of the Code from
which section 5(b) were derived to supplement the "reasonably
equivalent value" standard of section 548 of the Code. Section 547(b)
of the Code follows section 60b of the Bankruptcy Act and includes
"transfer[s] to or for the benefit of a[n insider] creditor."'' 56 If the
reference in UFTA section 5(b) to a "transfer... made to an insider"
is not construed to include such indirect transfers, a provision in-
serted to bring the UFTA into harmony with the Code and to prevent
the creation of a "vulnerable" gap for preferential insider transfers5 7
would instead leave a serious loophole of the very type that it was
intended to prevent.
Third, UFTA section 8(b)(1) provides that in the case of a trans-
fer voidable under the Act, "the creditor may recover judgment for
the value of the asset transferred. .. against: (1) the first transferee of
the asset or the person for whose benefit the transfer was made.'" 8
Section 8(f)(1) similarly provides that "[a] transfer is not voidable
under Section 5(b): (1) to the extent the insider gave new value to or
for the benefit of the debtor after the transfer was made."' 59 Such
references would indicate that the draftsmen of the UFTA intended
to include indirect as well as direct transfers within the scope of sec-
tion 5(b).
Fourth, construction of "transfer" to mean indirect, as well as
direct, insider preferential transfers is a normal process in construing
statutes to implement their underlying policy. This process is aptly
illustrated by the law with respect to the converse cases of whether a
debtor may receive "fair consideration" or "reasonably equivalent
value" by reason of a transfer to a related third party. Notwithstand-
ing the lack of any statutory reference to indirect transfers in this
connection, numerous cases have held that where a benefit to the
debtor can be demonstrated, it will suffice for this purpose even
'55 See Kennedy, supra note 54.
156 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(1) (1982).
157 See Kennedy, supra note 54, at 204-05.
358 U.F.T.A. § 8(b)(1), 7A U.L.A. 662 (1985) (emphasis added).
'59 Id. § 8(f)(1), 7A U.L.A. 662-63 (emphasis added).
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though it may be indirect. 160 The difficulty, however, is not so much
the language employed, but whether the omission of the reference to
"for the benefit of" demonstrates a contrary statutory policy.
Although the omission creates some inference that indirect transfers
are not included, such an inference seems much less persuasive than
the considerations reviewed above, which strongly suggest that the
draftsmen could not have intended the exclusion of indirect transfers.
Finally, as previously noted, section 5(b) was adopted late in the
drafting process.' 6 1 This belated insertion of the section makes the
inference even more plausible that the omission was an inadvertent
error in the last stages of preparation and that it was not intended to
exclude indirect transfers from the sweep of a provision intended to
close the door to insider preferential transfers generally. Thus, all
things considered, it would appear that section 5(b) should be read to
include indirect preferential insider transfers and thereby conform to
section 547(b) of the Code. A contrary construction would create a
deplorable gap in the statute that would call for immediate
rectification.
Above and beyond the issue of the application of section 5(b),
there is a possible alternative route for striking down such indirect
transfers as fraudulent under the UFTA. Section 4(a)(1), the roots of
which go back to the Statute of 13 Elizabeth 1162 is applicable to any
transfer "with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor"
without reference to "reasonably equivalent value."'163 While, this
provision could be invoked to deal with cases of indirect preferential
insider transactions, it is obviously not a desirable route. In addition
to the necessity of ploughing new ground, such an attack would also
have to run the hurdle of proving "actual intent" in order to render
fraudulent a transaction that had been constructively fraudulent
under prior law. It would remain available, however, as a last resort.
In the event that section 5(b) is construed to include transfers
"for the benefit" of an insider, it clearly covers transfers by a debtor in
payment of antecedent indebtedness guaranteed by an insider, that is,
upstream, cross-stream, and downstream guaranties. Numerous cases
under section 547(b)(4) have so held."6
160 See id. § 6 comment 3, 7A U.L.A. 660; P. Blumberg, Corporate Groups: Bankruptcy,
supra note 6, § 8.04 to .07, at 347-53; Walls, supra note 75, at 222.
161 See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
162 Statute of 13 Eliz. I, ch. 5 (1570).
163 U.F.T.A. § 4(a)(1), 7A U.L.A. 653 (1985).
164 E.g., Mixon v. Anderson (In re Ozark Restaurant Equip. Co.), 41 Bankr. 476 (Bankr.
W.D. Ark. 1984), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 61 Bankr. 750 (W.D. Ark. 1986), aff'd, 816 F.2d
1222 (8th Cir. 1987); Levit v. Melrose Park Nat'l Bank (In re V.N. Deprizio Constr. Co.), 58
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b. Transfer by a Debtor-Guarantor in Satisfaction of an Insider's
Debt
Unlike the foregoing problem of the debtor-obligor and insider-
guarantor, which is relatively common, the converse problem of the
debtor-guarantor and the insider-obligor has not been the subject of
much judicial inquiry. It involves a transfer by a debtor-guarantor in
payment of an antecedent debt on which it is secondarily liable that
benefits an insider-obligor. While the transfer has been to the creditor
for the benefit of the insider, not to the insider, the debtor's estate has
been depleted for the benefit of the insider, and creditors have been
prejudiced. Accordingly, the transfer should be voidable as it was
under the UFCA and the Bankruptcy Act, and as it is under the
Code. Although the debtor is subrogated to the creditor's rights
against the insider, avoidance of the transfer will almost invariably be
a much more appealing remedy than pursuing a claim against the
insider.
c. Transfer by an Insider-Guarantor in Satisfaction of Debt of the
Debtor-Obligor
Where a guarantor makes a transfer to reduce the indebtedness
of the debtor, there has been no transfer by the debtor. The guarantor
will be subrogated to the rights of the creditor against the debtor.
This change in the identity of the creditor results in no change in the
debtor's assets or liabilities, nor any depletion of its estate. Accord-
ingly, the issue of a fraudulent transfer (or of a voidable preference
under the Code) does not normally arise when a guarantor satisfies a
debtor-obligor's indebtedness that it has guaranteed. Where, how-
ever, the guarantor and the debtor are controlled corporation and
controlling shareholder, or under common control, as in the case of
affiliated corporations of a corporate group, the problem is more
complex.
In the case of intragroup guaranties and transactions, the ques-
Bankr. 478 (Bankr. N.D. Il1. 1986); Bergquist v. Anderson-Greenwood Aviation Corp. (In re
Bellanca Aircraft Corp.), 56 Bankr. 339 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985); Beemer v. Crandon Enters.
(In re Holly Hill Medical Center), 53 Bankr. 412 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1985); Marketing Re-
sources Int'l Corp. v. PTC Corp. (In re Marketing Resources Int'l Corp.), 41 Bankr. 575
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984); Mixon v. Mid-Continent Sys., Inc. (In re Big Three Transp., Inc.), 41
Bankr. 16 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1983); McColley v. Matmon Gem Co. (In re Candor Diamond
Corp.), 44 Bankr. 195 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984); Backhus v. Central Trust Co. (In re Duccilli
Formal Wear, Inc.), 24 Bankr. 699 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982); Seeley v. Church Bldgs. & Interi-
ors (In re Church Bldgs. & Interiors, Inc.), 14 Bankr. 128 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1981). See
Goldberger v. Davis Jay Corregated Box Corp. (In re Mercon Indus. Inc.), 37 Bankr. 549
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984).
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tion arises whether the consequences of a transfer by one affiliate of a
corporate group will be attributed to another affiliate so as to render a
transaction not literally within the Uniform Acts nevertheless subject
to avoidance thereunder. Thus, the Uniform Acts require that the
challenged transfer be of "the property of the debtor." 1 65 When is a
transfer by an affiliate deemed a transfer of "the property of the
debtor?" Our starting point is the generally accepted proposition
that, in light of the statutory reference to "the property of the
debtor," a third-party payment of an obligation of an insolvent debtor
cannot be attacked as a preference where the payment has been made
without the transfer of any "property of the debtor."' 166 If the chal-
lenge is to be upheld, the debtor's estate must be depleted.167
This rule rests on the general principle that a payment by a third
party from its own property does not involve either the debtor or the
debtor's property. In the case of a corporate group, however, pay-
ment by one of its components of the debt of another component,
where both are engaged in the conduct of an integrated business or
are otherwise closely interrelated, may nevertheless constitute a pref-
erential transfer if the court is prepared to look upon the component
companies as collectively comprising a single enterprise. This com-
plex problem necessarily involves a comprehensive review of the nu-
merous cases in allied areas of affiliated corporations (or controlled
corporations and controlling shareholders) involving fraudulent
transfers and voidable preferences under the UFCA, the Code, and
the Bankruptcy Act. Such a review is beyond the scope of this Arti-
cle. 168 In brief, in the area as a whole, the cases are divided with most
courts treating such interrelated parties as separate entities for pur-
poses of the statute. 6 9 A significant minority, including more recent
165 The UFTA refers to a transfer. U.F.T.A. §§ 4-5, 7A U.L.A. 652-53, 657 (1985). It
defines "transfer" as "disposing of or parting with an asset or an interest in an asset," and it
defines "asset" as "property of a debtor." Id. §§ 1(2), 1(12), 7A U.L.A. 644, 645. The UFCA
is comparable. See U.F.C.A. § 1, 7A U.L.A. 430 (1985).
166 Mason v. National Herkimer County Bank, 172 F. 529 (2d Cir. 1909), aff'd sub noma.
National Bank v. National Herkimer County Bank, 225 U.S. 178 (1912); I-T-E Circuit
Breaker Co. v. Holzman, 354 F.2d 102 (9th Cir. 1965); Grubb v. General Contract Purchase
Corp., 94 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1938); In re Hines, 144 F. 543 (,V.D. Pa. 1906); Dressel v. North
State Lumber Co., 119 F. 531 (E.D.N.C. 1902); Marketing Resources Int'l Corp. v. PTC Corp.
(In re Marketing Resources Int'l Corp.), 41 Bankr. 575 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984).
167 See Rubin v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 661 F.2d 979, 992 (2d Cir. 1981) (de-
pletion of estate was decisive).
168 See Blumberg, Corporate Groups: Bankruptcy, supra note 6, at 335-98. See also Litt-
man, supra note 1.
169 See, e.g., Markow v. Alcock, 356 F.2d 194 (5th Cir. 1966); I-T-E Circuit Breaker Co. v.
Holzman, 354 F.2d 102 (9th Cir. 1965); Galsworthy, Inc. v. Kennedy (In re Le Maire Cos-
metic Co.), 174 F.2d 749 (7th Cir. 1949); Mandel v. Scanlon, 426 F. Supp. 519 (W.D. Pa.
1977); Ajax Shoe & Leather Co. v. Selig, 305 Mass. 389, 25 N.E.2d 990 (1940); Stone v. Allied
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cases, however, support the view that a transfer by an affiliate may be
attributed to a debtor.170
A number of recent cases shed light on the resolution of the
problem in the specific area under review. The decision in Lawless v.
Elmira Milk Producers Cooperative Association (In re Stop-N-Go of
Elmira, Inc.), 171 decided in 1983 under section 60a of the Bankruptcy
Act, involved a subsidiary's issuance of a guaranty of its parent's debt
to its supplier, a transaction that rendered the subsidiary insolvent.
The court found the subsidiary's subsequent payments in satisfaction
of the debt a preference to the supplier and did so in reliance on enter-
prise principles and without reference to piercing the corporate veil
doctrines. The court relied on the creditor's sophistication, its in-
volvement in the "financial woes" of the group, and its knowledge of
the parties' close relationship. 72  The shareholder-operators had
caused the subsidiary to guarantee the parent's debt to the supplier
when the supplier learned that the subsidiary was negotiating for the
sale of its twenty-six retail outlets. After the sale, the subsidiary made
a $723,915 payment to the supplier under its guaranty. This payment
represented the overwhelming bulk of the sales proceeds remaining
after payment of the secured creditors. Only $6,000 was left for the
subsidiary's unsecured creditors, who held claims of about
$1,000,000. The court found that on the facts the supplier was
chargeable with knowledge that the transaction rendered the subsidi-
ary insolvent. The companies were part of an economically integrated
business and, as the court found, treated by their principals "almost
as one company."'' 73
Coleman American Moving Services, Inc. v. First National Bank
and Trust Co. (In re American Properties, Inc.), 174 decided under the
Code, involved a parent corporation's refinancing of an outstanding
bank debt of its insolvent subsidiary. The parent arranged a new loan
Clothing Corp., 140 N.J. Eq. 224, 54 A.2d 625 (Ch. 1947); McKay v. Sperry Flour Co., 95
Wash. 209, 163 P. 377 (1917).
170 See, e.g., Cissell v. First Nat'l Bank, 476 F. Supp. 474 (S.D. Ohio 1979); Hillebrand v.
Sav-Co., 353 F. Supp. 19 (E.D. 11. 1972); Lawless v. Eastern Milk Producers Coop. Ass'n (In
re Stop-N-Go, Inc.), 30 Bankr. 721 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1983); Reese v. Akai Am., Ltd., 19
Bankr. 83 (S.D. Fla. 1982); Coleman Am. Moving Servs., Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.
(In re American Properties, Inc.), 14 Bankr. 637 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1981); cf. Regal Ware, Inc.
v. Fidelity Corp., 550 F.2d 934 (4th Cir.) (subsidiary's transfer to protect parent against poten-
tial liability on its guaranty of subsidiary's debts deemed fraudulent), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
824 (1977).
171 30 Bankr. 721 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1983).
172 The supplier was a milk producer, the parent was a milk processor, and the subsidiary
was a major retail outlet. Id. at 722.
173 Id. at 726.
174 14 Bankr. 637 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1981).
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from the same bank, secured by a mortgage on assets of a sister sub-
sidiary. The loan proceeds moved from the bank to the new borrower
to the old borrower and back to the bank. The court readily found
inapplicable the usual rule that a third-party transfer to a creditor not
involving property of the debtor was not a preference, 175 given the
interrelationship between the subsidiaries and the bank's form of
structuring the transaction. The court accordingly held that the loan
repayment was a preference under section 547 as well as a fraudulent
transfer under section 548 of the Code. 176
Even though the Fourth Circuit did not find it necessary to de-
cide whether a subsidiary and its appendant second-tier subsidiary
should be deemed a "single business enterprise," Regal Ware, Inc. v.
Fidelity Corp. 177 should also be considered. In Regal Ware, the court
found a preference where the subsidiary's transfer of accounts receiva-
ble to its second-tier subsidiary and retransfer to a sister subsidiary,
which was the financing affiliate of the group, inured to the parent's
benefit by protecting it against potential liability on its guaranty of the
subsidiary's debts in preference to creditors of the subsidiary. 178
These cases introduced a welcome recognition that the econom-
ics of the business, rather than legal formalities, should control the
outcome.' 79 They may herald a changing approach on the part of
courts faced with allegedly fraudulent transfers involving corporate
groups arising under the UFTA and the Code.
As noted, the insider-guarantor making a payment of the guaran-
teed obligation is subrogated to the rights of the creditor against the
debtor. What is the status of the claim against the debtor to which
the insider-guarantor has been subrogated? May this claim be set off
against any claim by the debtor relating to prior fraudulent transfer or
preferential transfer from the debtor to, or for the benefit of, the
insider?
UFTA section 8(f)(1) contains provisions for limits of liability
that must be considered in order to properly answer these questions.
It provides that "[a] transfer is not voidable under Section 5(b): (1) to
the extent the insider gave new value to or for the benefit of the debtor
after the transfer was made unless the new value was secured by a
valid lien."' 80 This setoff enables the insider that has received a pref-
erential transfer to reduce its liability to the extent of new value subse-
175 See supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
176 American Properties, 14 Bankr. at 642-44.
177 550 F.2d 934, 944 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 824 (1977).
178 Id. at 944-46.
179 See Littman, supra note 1, at 324, 335-36.
180 U.F.T.A. § 8(f), 7A U.L.A. 663 (1985) (emphasis added).
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quently advanced to the debtor. An issue that may arise under
section 8(f)(1) is whether a payment by an insider-guarantor honor-
ing its guaranty of the debtor's obligation constitutes "new value" for
purposes of section 8(f)(1). Although no cases have yet to be decided
in connection with this issue under UFTA section 8(f), several cases
have held under section 547(c)(4) of the Code-the companion provi-
sion to section 8(f)(1) and after which it was modeled-that such pay-
ments constitute "new value" within the meaning of the Code.' 8 ' As
the court stated in Bergquist v. Anderson-Greenwood Aviation Corp.
(In re Ballanca Aircraft Corp.):'8 2
Upon honoring a guarantee, the guarantor gives new value for the
benefit of a debtor and is thereby subrogated to the rights of the
guaranteed supplier or lender. The supplier's or lender's claim to
new value then vanishes and the guarantor becomes entitled to a
section 547(c)(4) offset as to preferential transfers made prior to
the original advance of new value by such supplier or lender.' 8 3
These decisions under UFTA section 8(f)(1)'s companion provision
in the Code will probably influence the courts' construction of section
8(f)(1).
d. Transfer by an Insider-Obligor in Satisfaction of Its Debt
Guaranteed by the Debtor
On the surface, a transfer by an insider-obligor in satisfaction of
its debt guaranteed by the debtor seems to be the simplest situation of
all. There has been no transfer of property by the debtor. Further,
since the insider making the transfer was satisfying its own obligation
for which it was primarily liable, no right of subrogation against the
debtor arises. Accordingly, the estate of the debtor, far from being
depleted, has been enhanced by the elimination of its contingent liabil-
ity under its guaranty. Nevertheless, if transfer by the affiliated in-
sider is attributed to the debtor, the transaction may still constitute a
voidable preference.
e. Position of Creditors Receiving Payments from Insiders in
Reduction of Guaranteed Indebtedness Where
Transfer Fraudulent
Within the corporate group, the UFCA's preferential transfer
181 See, e.g., Bergquist v. Anderson-Greenwood Aviation Corp. (In re Bellanca Aircraft
Corp.), 56 Bankr. 339, 394-95 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985) (quoted infra at text accompanying note
183); Aetna Business Credit v. Hart Ski Mfg. Co. (In re Hart Ski Mfg. Co.), 7 Bankr. 465, 468-
69 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1980).
182 56 Bankr. 339 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985).
183 Id. at 394.
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provisions as well as the voidable preference provisions of section
547(b) of the Code, create a potential hazard with respect to the status
of payments by one affiliate of indebtedness guaranteed by another
affiliate that fall within the statutory provisions. These hazards face
the creditor of guaranteed indebtedness as well as the guarantor. Fol-
lowing the provisions of section 550(a) of the Code, 84 UFTA section
8(b)(1) provides that in the case of a preferential transfer voidable
under the UFTA, "the creditor may recover judgment for the value of
the asset transferred ... against: (1) the first transferee of the asset or
the person for whose benefit the transfer was made."'' 85 This provi-
sion exposes an unrelated creditor who is the transferee of a pro-
scribed transfer to possible liability. 86
No cases have as yet construed UFTA section 8(b)(1). How-
ever, commentators have disagreed on the application of section
550(a) of the Code to an unrelated creditor-transferee of a proscribed
transfer. 87 The numerous cases decided under the Code regarding
this question have overwhelmingly held that the imposi-
tion of transferee liability upon an unrelated lender was discretionary
under section 550(a) because of the use of the disjunctive in the
statute. Courts have refused to impose liability on lenders in cases
of preferential transfers involving insider-guarantors. 8 8  Only
184 11 U.S.C. § 550(a) (1982).
185 U.F.T.A. § 8(b)(1), 7A U.L.A. 662 (1985) (emphasis added).
186 UFTA § 8(a) contains an exception: "A transfer or obligation is not voidable under
Section 4(a)(1) against a person who took in good faith and for a reasonably equivalent value
or against any subsequent transferee or obligee." U.F.T.A. § 8(a), 7A U.L.A. 662 (1985).
Since § 8(a) refers only to § 4(a)(l), the exception contained therein does not apply to transfers
under §§ 4(a)(2), 5(a) or 5(b). See id. This provision differs from the exception contained in
the Code. Section 550(b)(1) of the Code bars recovery from "a transferee that takes for value,
including satisfaction or securing of a present or antecedent debt, in good faith, and without
knowledge of the voidability of the transfer avoided." 11 U.S.C. § 550(b)(1) (1982). The offi-
cial comment to UFTA § 8(a) explains the omission of the reference to the voidability of the
transfer language appearing in the Code. It terms such knowledge "inconsistent with the good
faith" standard; further, it concludes that the court should not be required "to inquire into the
legal sophistication of the transferee." U.F.T.A. § 8 comment 2, 7A U.L.A. 663 (1985).
187 Compare 4 Collier on Bankruptcy 1 550.02, at 550-5 to 6 (L. King 15th ed. 1987) and
Nutovic, The Bankruptcy Preference Laws: Interpreting Code Sections 547(c)(2), 550(a)(1),
and 546 (a)(1), 41 Bus. Law. 175, 189 (1985) with Pitts, supra note 87, at 346-56.
I88 E.g., Levit v. Melrose Park Nat'l Bank (In re V.N. Deprizio Constr. Co.), 58 Bankr. 478
(Bankr. N.D. II1. 1986); In re Aerco Metals, Inc., 60 Bankr. 77 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1985);
Schmitt v. Equibank (In re R.A. Beck Builder, Inc.), 34 Bankr. 888 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1983);
Bakst v. Schilling (In re Cove Patio Corp.), 19 Bankr. 843 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982); Seeley v.
Church Bldgs. & Interiors, Inc. (In re Church Bldgs. & Interiors, Inc.), 14 Bankr. 128 (Bankr.
W.D. Okla. 1981); cf. Goldberger v. Davis Jay Corregated Box Corp. (In re Mercon Indus.),
37 Bankr. 549 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984) (creditors who are not insiders should be protected if
efrect otherwise would be to preferentially benefit insider-guarantors).
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one jurisdiction has disagreed. 89
C. Guaranties of "Insider" Obligations
As discussed above, 9 ° UFTA section 5(b) applies only to trans-
fers and does not apply to guaranties. The issuance of guaranties is
subject to the provisions of UFTA sections 4(a)(1) and 4(a)(2). Sec-
tion 4(a)(1) applies to the issuance of a guaranty with an "actual in-
tent to hinder, delay, or defraud" without regard to whether
"reasonably equivalent value" was received in exchange.' 9'
Section 4(a)(2) utilizes a constructive fraud standard. Instead of
the "insolvency" standard of section 5(b), section 4(a)(2) applies to
guaranties issued by a debtor with "unreasonably small... remaining
assets," or that "intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should
have believed that he [or she] would incur, debts beyond his [or her]
ability to pay as they became due."'' 92 Further, under section 4(a)(2),
the guaranty must have been issued "without receiving a reasonably
equivalent value in exchange.' 1 93 In the case of the issuance of a
guaranty of antecedent indebtedness, the "reasonably equivalent
value" standard clearly cannot be satisfied under section 4(a)(2).
When new indebtedness is guaranteed, the validity of the upstream or
cross-stream or other insider guaranties will depend, inter alia, on
whether the guarantor receives "a reasonably equivalent value" in ex-
change for the financing to which the guaranty relates. 194
In determining the "reasonably equivalent value" for a guaranty,
the issue is obviously the consideration received by the guarantor, not
the primary obligor. The cases construing "fair consideration"
demonstrate that guaranties made for the benefit of third parties are
not given for "reasonably equivalent value." The benefit must be to
the guarantor. 95 Similarly, in the case of transfers, benefit must be to
189 Mixon v. Mid-Continent Sys., Inc. (In re Big Three Transp., Inc.), 41 Bankr. 16, 20-21
(Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1983). See First State Bank v. W.E. Tucker Oil (I re W.E. Tucker Oil
Inc.), 42 Bankr. 898, 901-02 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1984) ("Property transferred within one year
of the filing of the petition in violation of (the Code] may be recovered from an insider who has
benefitted therefrom."); cf. Mixon v. Anderson (In re Ozark Restaurant Equip. Co.), 41
Bankr. 476 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1984), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 61 Bankr. 750 (W.D. Ark.
1986) (in case involving preferential transfer, recovery allowed against creditor who was also
an insider), aff'd, 816 F.2d 1222 (8th Cir. 1987).
190 See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
191 U.F.T.A. § 4(a)(1), 7A U.L.A. 652 (1985).
192 UFTA § 4(a)(2) is quoted supra, at text accompanying note 103.
193 U.F.T.A. § 4(a)(2), 7A U.L.A. 653 (1985).
194 See Blumberg, Corporate Groups: Bankruptcy, supra note 6, at 285-398; Littman, supra
note i; Ragusin, supra note 14; Rosenberg, supra note 14; Walls, supra note 75, at 224-35;
Note, Section 548(a)(2), supra note 14.
195 See In re Nelsen, 24 Bankr. 701, 702 (Bankr. D. Or. 1982); Zellerbach Paper Co. v.
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the transferor.1 96 The critical question under section 4(a)(2) is when
financing assistance to the affiliate will benefit the guarantor. Thus, if
a portion of the proceeds of the financing is paid to the guarantor, the
intragroup transfer cases demonstrate that this circumstance obvi-
ously must be taken into account. 97 If other tangible and quantifiable
benefits move to the guarantor, those also may constitute "reasonably
equivalent value."'' 98
In most intragroup guaranty cases, however, the only objective
realized by the guarantor is the strengthening of the financial position
of an affiliate and therefore of the corporate group of which it is a
part. 99 This may be of major importance in a group that is economi-
cally integrated and where group allocation of resources prevails
within the enterprise-but will it satisfy the statute? In Rubin v.
Valley Nat'l Bank, 13 Ariz. App. 431, 477 P.2d 550 (1970); 4 Collier on Bankruptcy q 67.33,
at 514.1 to 515 (J. Moore & L. King 14th ed. 1978); Annotation, Transaction in Consideration
of Discharge of Antecedent Debt Owed by One Other Than Grantor as Based on "Fair Con-
sideration" under Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, 30 A.L.R.2d 1209 (1953).
A case arising under the Code and construing "reasonably equivalent value" has reached
the same conclusion. Ear, Nose & Throat Surgeons, Inc. v. Guaranty Bank & Trust Co. (In re
Ear Nose & Throat Surgeons, Inc.), 49 Bankr. 316 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1985).
196 Bullard v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 468 F.2d 11 (7th Cir. 1972); United Towing Co. v.
Phillips, 242 F.2d 627 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 861 (1957); In re Security Prods. Co.,
310 F. Supp. 110 (E.D. Mo. 1969); Bennett v. Rodman & English, Inc., 2 F. Supp. 355
(E.D.N.Y.), aff'd per curiam, 62 F.2d 1064 (2d Cir. 1932); Wells Fargo Bank v. Desert View
Bldg. Supplies, Inc. (In re Desert View Bldg. Supplies, Inc.), 14 C.B.C. 171, 178 (Bankr. D.
Nev. 1977), aff'd, 475 F. Supp. 693 (D. Nev. 1978), aff'd mem., 633 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1980);
Hall v. Arthur Young & Co. (In re Computer Universe, Inc.), 58 Bankr. 28 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1986); Bailey v. Commerce Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n (In re Butcher), 51 Bankr. 61 (Bankr. E.D.
Tenn. 1985). See Coors, Inc. v. Bank of Longview (fi re Coors of North Mississippi, Inc.), 66
Bankr. 845 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 1986).
197 Klein v. Tabatchnick, 610 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1979) (transfer); Mayo v. Pioneer Bank &
Trust Co., 270 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1959) (same), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 962 (1960); Beemer v.
Walter E. Heller, Inc. (In re Holly Hill Medical Center, Inc.), 44 Bankr. 253 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. 1984) (same); cf. McNellis v. Raymond, 287 F. Supp. 232, 238-39 (N.D.N.Y. 1968)
(transfer), aff'd in relevant part, 420 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1970); Ear, Nose & Throat Surgeons,
Inc. v. Guaranty Bank & Trust Co. (In re Ear, Nose & Throat Surgeons, Inc.), 49 Bankr. 316
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1985) (guaranty).
As discussed supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text, the draftsmen of the Minnesota
statute authorizing intragroup guaranties under its corporation law reached the same conclu-
sion, stating: "The ability to bolster the finances of a related corporation ... is important
because these related corporations are often part of one economic unit within which artificial
distinctions should not prevent internal transfers of funds." Minn. Stat. Ann. § 302A.501,
reporter's notes-general comment (West 1985).
198 See Howco Leasing Corp. v. Alexander Dispos-Haul Sys., Inc. (In re Alexander Dispos-
Haul Sys., Inc.), 36 Bankr. 612, 616 (Bankr. D. Or. 1983). See also Rubin v. Manufacturers
Hanover Trust Co., 661 F.2d 979, 991-94 (2d Cir. 1981) (section 67d "requires only 'fair'
consideration, not a penny-for-penny exchange.").
199 Even in the leveraged buyout, this strengthening will not occur. In such acquisitions,
the assets or credit of the companies being acquired are committed to the payment of the
purchase price; the financial position of the group is weakened, not enhanced.
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Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co.,20° a case decided under the Bank-
ruptcy Act, the Second Circuit held that such benefit was too intangi-
ble to qualify as "fair consideration" for purposes of the statute.
Some commentators are in accord.2° '
Where, however, the court is willing to accept enterprise law and
look at the impact of the financing on the group, corporate cross-
stream and upstream guaranties can readily satisfy the Uniform Acts.
Thus, in Telefest, Inc. v. VU-TV Inc.,202 the court held that an up-
stream guaranty within a corporate group used to assist the parent in
a financing that would benefit the group as a whole provided sufficient
indirect benefit to the subsidiary to satisfy the "fair consideration"
requirement under the UFCA.2 °3 Firmly adopting an enterprise view,
the Telefest court said:
In any event, the notion that a benefit accrues to a subsidiary
only when there is a direct flow of capital to that entity [as] the
result of its guarantee of a loan to its parent is inhibitory of con-
temporary financing practices, which recognize that cross-guaran-
tees are often needed because of the unequal abilities of interrelated
corporate entities to collateralize loans.... Contemporary corpo-
rate practices of vertically and horizontally dividing the integrated
operations of what is essentially one enterprise among a number of
legally distinct entities, making it necessary for financial institu-
tions to frequently obtain "upstream" and "cross-stream" collater-
alizations, demand that a broad view of "fair consideration" be
taken.2 °4
Other possible sources of "reasonably equivalent value" are the
right of subrogation against the primary obligor and the right to con-
tribution from the co-guarantors. Where the primary obligor is sol-
vent, the right of subrogation fully offsets the liability under the
guaranty and should constitute "reasonably equivalent value." In-
deed, a number of courts have so held.205 The right to contribution is
another matter. Even if the co-guarantor is solvent, the contribution
200 661 F.2d 979.
201 See Coquillette, supra note 3, at 453; Rosenberg, supra note 14, at 243-45; but see Walls,
supra note 75, at 224-35 (upstream guaranty "waging an uphill battle"). See also United States
v. Gleneagles Inv. Co., 565 F. Supp. 556, 576-77 (M.D. Pa. 1983) (court did not reject this
theory upon consideration, but found it unnecessary to pass on its validity), modified on other
grounds sub nom. United States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288 (3d Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3229 (1987).
202 591 F. Supp. 1368 (D.N.J. 1984).
203 Id. at 1378-81.
204 Id. at 1379-80.
205 Id. at 1375 n.5; Howco Leasing Corp. v. Alexander Dispos-Haul Sys., Inc. (In re Alex-
ander Dispos-Haul Sys., Inc.), 36 Bankr. 612, 616 (Bankr. D. Or. 1983); In re Nelsen, 24
Bankr. 701, 701 (Bankr. D. Or. 1982). See Coquillette, supra note 3, at 453 n.68.
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can only partially reduce the liability under the guaranty. Since in all
circumstances, notwithstanding the solvency of the co-guarantor, the
debtor will have some net liability, it is difficult to see how "reason-
ably equivalent value" can be present.20 6 The definition of "asset" in
UFTA section 1(2) has been drafted so that a "contingent claim of a
surety for reimbursement, contribution, or subrogation may be
counted as an asset for the purpose of determining whether the holder
of the claim is solvent as a debtor. '" 20 7
D. Revised Standard for Determining When an Obligation Is
Incurred (Section 6(5))
UFTA section 6(5) provides that "an obligation is incurred: if
oral, when it becomes effective," or, if written, "when . . .deliv-
ered." 20 8 This section is intended to "resolve uncertainty arising
from" the Second Circuit's decision in Rubin v. Manufacturers Hano-
ver Trust Co. ,209 "insofar as [Rubin] holds that an obligation of guar-
anty may be deemed to be incurred when advances covered by the
guaranty are made rather than when the guaranty first became effec-
tive between the parties." 210 The Rubin case has generally been ac-
cepted by the courts, 21 and its construction of the Bankruptcy Act
will likely prevail under the Code as well.
When a creditor bargains for a guaranty, this provision in the
UFTA eliminates the uncertainty arising from the possibility that the
financial condition of the guarantor will worsen during any interval
between the execution of the financing agreement and the advances
made thereunder to the point where it renders fraudulent under the
UFCA payments honoring a guaranty that was valid when made. It
therefore makes upstream and cross-stream (and other) guaranties
more marketable in packaging group financing by relieving lenders of
the ongoing burden of having to continue to police the condition of
the guarantor and its affiliates to determine whether their condition at
the time of the advance would render the guaranty fraudulent. Fur-
206 The evaluation of the right of subrogation and the right to contribution for purposes of
"reasonably equivalent value" presents a very different question than their value for purposes
of determining the guarantor's solvency. For determination of solvency, the right to contribu-
tion is an asset as far as it goes.
207 U.F.T.A. § 1 comment 2, 7A U.L.A. 645 (1985).
208 Id. § 6(b), 7A U.L.A. 659 (1985).
209 661 F.2d 979 (2d Cir. 1981) (decided under the Bankruptcy Act).
210 U.F.T.A. § 6 comment 3, 7A U.L.A. 639, 660 (1985).
211 See, e.g., Ear, Nose & Throat Surgeons, Inc. (In re Ear Nose & Throat Surgeons, Inc.),
49 Bankr. 316 (Bankr. D. Mass 1985); Corporate Jet Aviation, Inc. v. Vantress (In re Corpo-
rate Jet Aviation, Inc.), 45 Bankr. 629 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1985); Beemer v. Walter E. Heller &
Co. (In re Holly Hill Medical Center, Inc.), 44 Bankr. 253 (M.D. Fla. 1984).
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ther, the earlier the guaranty is deemed effective, the sooner section
547(b)'s ninety-day period of vulnerability rendering preferences void-
able for others than insiders commences and expires.
It is doubtful whether the inclusion of section 6(5) is desirable.
The wisdom of adopting a rule for purposes of the UFTA that is dif-
ferent from the rules governing comparable situations under the Code
is open to question. Indeed, the motivation for the UFTA was the
commendable interest in harmonizing state law with the Code. Sec-
tion 6(5) is a departure from this sound principle.
E. Shortened Periods of Limitation and Extinguishment of Right
Not Merely Remedy
The issue of the appropriate period of limitations for actions
under the UFTA is one of considerable importance because it pro-
vides bankruptcy trustees as well as creditors a significantly longer
time to pursue remedies than the much more restricted period con-
tained in the Code and the Bankruptcy Act. The Code only renders
fraudulent those transfers taking place within one year of the filing of
the petition.21 2 In contrast, state laws under the UFCA had generally
provided for much longer periods. Since section 544(b) of the Code213
authorizes the trustee to pursue fraudulent transfers under state law,
reliance on such state law provided an important additional remedy
for the trustee to sidestep the Code's one-year limitation contained in
section 548.
However, there was an anomaly in state law: the periods of limi-
tation for pursuing rights under the UFCA were not uniform. For
example, New York21 4 and Pennsylvania 215 provided for limitations
periods of six years, and Texas21 6 for four years; whereas Missouri
provided for ten years for land and five years generally.21 7 Further,
the official comment to the UFTA points out that the state statutes
212 11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
213 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) (1982).
214 N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. 213(8) (McKinney Supp. 1986); see Dolmetta v. Uintah Nat'l
Corp., 712 F.2d 15, 20 (2d Cir. 1983); Quadrozzi Concrete Corp. v. Mastroianni, 56 A.D.2d
353, 358, 392 N.Y.S.2d 687, 690 (1977); Martin v. Martin, 29 A.D.2d 864, 866, 288 N.Y.S.2d
374, 376 (1968), modified, 23 N.Y.2d 858, 245 N.E.2d 801 (1969).
215 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann § 5527 (Purdon Supp. 1987); see United States v. Gleneagles Inv.
Co., 565 F. Supp. 556, 583 (M.D. Pa. 1983), modified sub nom. United States v. Tabor Court
Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3229 (1987).
216 Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 24.02 to .03 (Vernon 1968); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.
Code Ann. § 16.051 (Vernon 1986); see Creel v. Lawler, 462 F. Supp. 118, 120 (N.D. Tex.
1978); Hoerster v. Wilke, 138 Tex. 263, 158 S.W.2d 288 (1942); Conner, supra note 62, at 809.
217 Mo. Ann. Stat. § 516.110 to .120 (Vernon 1952); see Coleman v. Alderman, 357 Mo.
758, 210 S.W.2d 994 (1948).
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not only lacked uniformity but were frequently subject to uncertain-
ties in their application. 218
UFTA section 9 commendably introduces for sections 4(a)(2)
and 5(a) a uniform statutory period of four years after the transfer
was made or the obligation was incurred.21 9 In the case of section
4(a)(l)-involving "actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud" 22 ---it
also provides for an additional period of one year after discovery
where the transfer or obligation was not or could not reasonably have
been discovered by the claimant until later than four years. 221
In contrast to the four-year period adopted generally, section
9(c) restricts the period to one year in the case of transfers under sec-
tion 5(b). 2 2 2 This restriction conforms to the one-year period in which
insider transfers constitute voidable preferences for purposes of sec-
tion 547(b)(4) of the Code. Although utilization of the one-year pro-
vision in the Code is understandable both in the Code and in the
UFTA, it loses sight of the derivation of Code sections 547(b)(4) and
5(b). The one-year provision became necessary because insider trans-
actions that would have constituted fraudulent transfers notwith-
standing adequate consideration by reason of the "good faith"
element of "fair consideration" would otherwise have become invul-
nerable as a result of the substitution of "reasonably equivalent value"
for "fair consideration." As noted, under the UFCA such insider
transactions were subject to the extended period of limitations for
fraudulent transfers varying from four to even ten years depending on
the state.223 Although UFTA section 5(b) was included to render
fraudulent voidable preferential transfers to insiders as UFCA sec-
tions 3 and 4 had done, UFTA section 9(c) takes a step backward by
singling out such tranfers and providing a special one-year limitation
period for them.224 This special one-year period contrasts with the
four-year period adopted for all other fraudulent transfers and an
even more liberal limitation period in most states under the UFCA.
Section 9 accomplishes another significant change by making it
clear that the lapse of the statutory limitation period bars the right,
not merely the remedy. As noted in the official comment,225 this pro-
vision was inserted to reject the contrary rule adopted in United States
218 See U.F.T.A. § 9 comment 2, 7A U.L.A. 666 (1985).
219 Id. § 9(b), 7A U.L.A. 665 (1985).
220 Id. § 4(a)(1), 7A U.L.A. 652 (1985).
221 Id. § 9(a), 7A U.L.A. 665 (1985).
222 Id. § 9(c).
223 See supra notes 214-18 and accompanying text.
224 U.F.T.A. § 9(c), 7A U.L.A. 665 (1985).
225 Id. § 9 comment 1, 7A U.L.A. 666 (1985).
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v. Gleneagles Investment Co. ,226 where a federal district court held
that a state statute of limitations did not apply to an action by the
United States based on the UFCA.2 2 7
CONCLUSION
The economic reality of corporate groups is plain. Enterprises
organized in the form of a group of companies conduct their affairs to
achieve performance for the group as a whole. Although the tradi-
tional corporation law has viewed each of the corporate affiliates
within the group as a separate legal entity with its own separate rights
and obligations, the law has slowly been adapting to the changing
reality of economic organizations with increasing reliance on "pierc-
ing-the-veil jurisprudence" or enterprise law. In the areas of insol-
vency and bankruptcy, this process has been evident with increasing
recognition of the potential problems that can arise in transactions
involving the debtor and its controlling shareholders and affiliates,
problems which are presented by almost every case involving corpo-
rate groups. This is evident not only in more sophisticated judicial
decisions but also in more sophisticated statutes. The provisions of
the Code and the UFTA reflect this development.
Upstream and cross-stream guaranties occupy an important
place in the process. They represent the inevitable response of lenders
and corporate groups in fashioning group financing to harness the
economic strength of a group to support the financing which will ef-
fectuate the objectives of the group, although it may not affect all
constituent companies, or even all guarantor-constituents, to the same
degree. It is important that this process be encouraged in order to
permit the more effective functioning of the economic system. It is
equally important to provide equivalent protection for creditors deal-
ing with group constituents against insider manipulation to their det-
riment as well as against economic consequences from legal rules
contrary to their expectations. This is a continuing challenge to the
law. The UFTA and the changes it incorporates with respect to in-
sider transactions are, notwithstanding minor areas of disagreement, a
considerable step forward in helping meet that challenge.
226 565 F. Supp. 556 (M.D. Pa. 1983), modified sub nom. United States v. Tabor Court
Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3229 (1987).
227 Id. at 583.
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